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We study rationing as a tool of the monopolist’s pricing strategy when demand is uncertain. Three pric-
ing strategies are potentially optimal in our environment: uniform pricing, ﬁnal sales, and introductory
oﬀers. The ﬁnal sales strategy consists in charging a high price initially, but then lowering the price
while committing to a total capacity. Consumers with high valuations to pay may decide to buy at the
high price since the endogenous probability of rationing is higher at the lower price. The introductory
oﬀers strategy consists in selling a limited quantity at a low price initially, and then raising price. Those
consumers with high valuations who were rationed initially at the lower price may ﬁnd it optimal to
buy the good at the higher price.
We show that while the introductory oﬀers strategy may dominate uniform pricing, it is never optimal
if the monopolist can use the ﬁnal sales strategy.
Keywords: rationing, priority pricing, sales, demand uncertainty, introductory oﬀer, price dispersion
JEL-Classiﬁcation: L12, M311I n t r o d u c t i o n
Firms frequently charge diﬀerent prices for the same good at diﬀerent points in time (and sometimes
even contemporaneously). Such (intertemporal) price dispersion is often generated by priority pricing
or ﬁnal sales:aﬁrm initially charges a high price and subsequently lowers the price for any remaining
items. Some consumers (namely those with a high willingness to pay or those who believe that demand
will be high) may prefer to purchase the good at the high price (so as to obtain the good with certainty)
rather than buying the good at a lower price and risking that the good may be sold out. Other consumers
(namely those with a low willingness to pay or those who believe that demand will be low) may resolve
the trade oﬀ by opting for a lower price and a higher probability of being rationed. Under demand
certainty, a ﬁnal sales strategy may thus allow a ﬁrm to screen between diﬀerent consumers with high
and low valuations. In the presence of demand uncertainty, setting diﬀerent prices may in addition allow
a ﬁrm to discriminate between demand states.
The pricing strategies of many opera houses, theaters, and concert venues involve priority pricing:
advance ticket sales are complemented by lower priced “community rush tickets”, “day seats”, or standby
tickets. Similarly, holiday tour operators and airlines typically oﬀer both regular and last-minute deals.
(In the case of last-minute holiday packages, the consumer may not obtain the destination or hotel of
choice, while in the case of stand-by airline tickets, the consumer buys the ticket in advance but risks
to be forced to take a later ﬂight, which he views as an inferior substitute.) Winter or summer sales for
fashion goods may also partially be explained by the idea of priority pricing. A less obvious example
of priority pricing concerns season tickets for sporting events (such as baseball or soccer) or cultural
events (such as concerts or operas); see Ferguson (1994). Some consumers may decide to buy a season
ticket knowing that they will miss many events so that the season ticket is likely to turn out to be more
expensive than buying single tickets only for those events the consumer actually attends. However, if
consumers choose to buy tickets only shortly prior to the event, they risk not obtaining the desired
ticket.1
In this paper, we consider the pricing (and capacity) policy of a monopolist who faces uncertain
demand. Before the state of demand is realized, the monopolist has to commit to prices and capacities
for each period. Then, consumers (who want to buy only one unit of the good) learn the state of
demand (or, at least, their own willingness to pay) and decide when to buy the good. Consumers
rationally anticipate the behavior of other consumers and thus the endogenous probabilities of rationing
in each period. Three pricing strategies are potentially optimal for the monopolist: uniform pricing,
ﬁnal sales, and introductory oﬀers. Uniform pricing means that the monopolist commits to charging the
same price in each period. As explained above, the ﬁnal sales strategy consists in charging a high price
initially, but then lowering the price while committing to a total capacity. High valuation consumers
may decide to buy at the high price since the endogenous probability of rationing is higher at the lower
price. The introductory oﬀer strategy consists in selling a limited quantity at a low price initially, and
then raising price. Those consumers with high valuations who were rationed at the lower price may ﬁnd
it optimal to buy the good later at the higher price.
In our model, there are two types of consumers (with high and low valuations, respectively), and
two demand states (a good and a bad state). We analyze two orthogonal cases of demand uncertainty:
vertical demand shifts (where a good demand shock increases the willingness to pay for all consumers)
and horizontal demand shifts (where a good demand shock increases the number of high valuation con-
sumers and the total number of consumers). For both types of demand shifts, we show that introductory
1This means that product bundling can implement priority pricing for those spectators who are only interested in
certain events for which rationing may occur. While living in England, the ﬁrst author of this article often bought a
season ticket for the famous BBC Promenade Concert Series at the Royal Albert Hall, London, knowing that he would
only attend a small fraction of the more than seventy concerts. His rationale was to make sure that he could attend some
o ft h em o r ep o p u l a rc o n c e r t s .
1oﬀers are always dominated by ﬁnal sales or uniform pricing strategies. In the case of vertical demand
shifts, ﬁnal sales always dominate all other pricing strategies. In the case of horizontal demand shifts,
ﬁnal sales and uniform pricing may both be optimal in diﬀerent circumstances.2
An example. Suppose there are two states of the world, a good demand state and a bad demand
state, which are equally likely. Consumers have unit demand and may either have a high or a low
valuation for the good. High types have a willingness to pay of 7, and low types a valuation of 1,
independently of the demand state. In the good demand state, there is a mass 1 of high types, and a
mass 5 of low types. In the bad demand state, there are no high types, and a mass 4 of low types. A
consumer who learns that he has a high valuation can thus infer that the demand state must be good.
(In this example, it is therefore immaterial whether the consumers directly learn the demand state or
only learn their own valuation before making their purchasing decision.) The monopolist produces at
zero marginal cost and may set prices and capacities for two periods. In the case of excess demand in
one period, consumers are rationed randomly. There is no discounting.
First, consider uniform pricing and introductory oﬀers. Conditional on charging a single price,
the monopolist will optimally set a price of 1. This yields expected proﬁts of 0.5 × 4+0 .5 × 6=
5. Alternatively, the monopolist can make a limited introductory oﬀer and charge a higher price to
consumers who are rationed in period 1. The monopolist’s optimal introductory oﬀer strategy is to oﬀer
4u n i t sa tap r i c eo f1i nt h eﬁrst period, and to serve any unserved consumers at a price of 7 in the second
period. Consumers arrive at random, and so are rationed with probability 1/3 in period 1, provided
the state of demand is good. Hence, consumers of mass 1/3 buy the good at the high price in the good
demand state. In expected terms, the monopolist makes a proﬁto f0.5×4+0.5×(4+(1/3)×7) = 5.167.
This strategy dominates uniform pricing.
Second, consider ﬁnal sales. The optimal strategy with ﬁnal sales consists in setting total capacity
equal to 4, charging a ﬁrst-period price p1 with 7 >p 1 > 1,a n do ﬀering all remaining units in the
second period at a price of p2 =1 . In the bad demand state, there are no high valuation consumers,
and all low valuation consumers purchase the good in the second period. In the high demand state,
all high type consumers buy the good in the ﬁrst period, while the low types demand the good in the
second period (and hence are rationed with probability 0.4). Indeed, high type consumers weakly prefer
to demand the good in the ﬁrst period rather than in the second period if 7−p1 ≥ 0.6×(7−1),w h e r e
0.6 is the probability of not being rationed in the second period. Hence, the monopolist will optimally
set p1 =3 .4,w h i c hr e s u l t si na ne x p e c t e dp r o ﬁto f0.5 × 4 × 1+0 .5 × (1 × 3.4+3× 1) = 5.2.
Comparing proﬁts, we observe that ﬁnal sales perform better than introductory oﬀers. Final sales
involve screening between high and low valuation consumers in the good demand state so that the
monopolist does not extract all of the surplus from high type consumers. Nevertheless, the introductory
oﬀers strategy performs worse since, in the good demand state, a share of high type consumers obtain
the good at the low second-period price.
Related Literature. Our paper complements the existing literature on pricing strategies with commit-
ment and provides a stronger theoretical underpinning for the use of ﬁnal sales strategies. Earlier work
has considered the use of introductory oﬀer and ﬁnal sales strategies under demand certainty. Wilson
(1988) analyzes the problem of a monopolist who wants to sell a given quantity q of a good. He shows
that an introductory oﬀer strategy may be more proﬁtable than a uniform pricing strategy (namely if
and only if there exists a neighborhood around q where the single-price revenue function is non-concave
in quantity). However, if the monopolist can choose the quantity q she wants to sell, and the marginal
cost of production is non-increasing, then uniform pricing is always optimal.3 Ferguson (1994) shows
the revenue equivalence between the best ﬁnal sales and the best introductory oﬀer strategy, for any
2In one case, a hybrid strategy which combines elements of ﬁnal sales and introductory oﬀers may be optimal.
3As Denicolo and Garella (1999) have shown, introductory oﬀers are also a useful strategy if the monopolist lacks
2given quantity q. Hence, these results do not allow us to predict when a monopolist should prefer a
ﬁnal sales strategy over an introductory oﬀer strategy, or vice versa. Moreover, the results indicate that
non-uniform pricing should only be observed when the single-price revenue function is non-concave in
quantity and there are decreasing returns to scale in production.
In a model similar to ours, Dana (2001) considers a monopolist who faces uncertain demand and
can serve any demand at constant marginal cost of production. He shows that introductory oﬀers may
dominate uniform pricing. However, Dana does not allow for ﬁnal sales strategies.4
Harris and Raviv (1981) also analyze monopoly pricing under demand uncertainty. They show that
priority pricing is an optimal strategy for a monopolist who produces at constant marginal costs but
faces a (binding) capacity constraint. However, in their model, demand uncertainty is of a very special
kind: there are a ﬁnite number of (large) buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Hence, as the number of buyers
increases, demand uncertainty vanishes in the limit. Furthermore, Harris and Raviv show that if the
monopolist can costlessly choose capacity (and thus serve any demand at constant marginal cost), then
uniform pricing dominates other pricing schemes (see also Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)).
To summarize, in a world where a monopolist can serve any demand at non-increasing marginal
costs, the literature so far lacks an explanation for the use of ﬁnal sales strategies which purely relies on
rationing. In our model, we show the non-optimality of introductory oﬀers and the potential optimality
of ﬁnal sales. This implies that the revenue equivalence between the two pricing strategies breaks down
when demand is uncertain.5
Our plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present our simple model. In sections 3 and
4, we then consider horizontal demand shifts. In section 3 we assume that consumers do not observe
the state of demand, but only learn their own type (and update their beliefs about aggregate demand
accordingly). In section 4, we assume that consumers observe the demand state before making their
purchasing decision. In both sections, we show that ﬁnal sales and uniform pricing strategies dominate
introductory oﬀer strategies. In section 5, we consider vertical demand shifts and show that ﬁnal sales
strategies dominate all other strategies, including introductory oﬀer strategies. Finally, in section 6, we
discuss our key assumptions and conclude.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a monopolist producing a homogeneous product and facing heterogeneous consumers with
uncertain demand. The monopolist can sell the good over T periods. For most of the paper, we assume
T =2 . There is no discounting.
Consumers. There is a mass M of potential consumers. There are two demand states (or “states of
the world”) σ ∈ {G,B}: a good demand state, G, and a bad demand state, B.I ne a c hd e m a n ds t a t e ,
each consumer gets a random draw of his willingness to pay. Consumer can have a high valuation or
a low valuation for the good. We also allow for the possibility that some consumers do not value the
good at all; we call such consumers “null types”. High types are denoted by H,l o wt y p e sb yL,n u l l
types by ∅, and the generic consumer type by θ ∈ {H,L,∅}.I nd e m a n ds t a t eσ, the probability that
ac o n s u m e r ’ st y p ei sθ is given by m(θ|σ)/M. Here, m(θ|σ) denotes the mass of consumers of type θ in
state σ.W ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ea r e( w e a k l y )m o r eh i g ht y p e si nt h eg o o dd e m a n ds t a t et h a ni nt h eb a d
commitment power beyond the ﬁrst period. Clearly, ﬁnal sales strategies can only be used if commitment for two periods
is possible.
4Dana (1998) provides a related model of advanced purchase discounts in competitive markets.
5We also want to mention some other less closely related work, namely Chao and Wilson (1987), Che and Gale (2000),
and Gale and Holmes (1992, 1993). For a discussion of that work, see Dana (2001). We clarify the relation of our paper
to other work in the last section.
3demand state; that is,
m(H|G) ≥ m(H|B).
Moreover, the total mass of consumers with positive valuation is at least as large in the good demand
s t a t ea si nt h eb a ds t a t e :
m(H|G)+m(L|G) ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B).
Consumers have unit demand. Conditional on buying one unit of the product at price p, a consumer of
type θ in demand state σ has (indirect) utility
v(θ|σ) − p,
where v(θ|σ) is the consumer’s willingness to pay. Since high types have a higher willingness to pay
than low types,
v(H|σ) >v (L|σ) for σ ∈ {G,B}.
Furthermore, the willingness to pay of a high or low type consumer is weakly increasing in the state of
demand; i.e.,
v(θ|G) ≥ v(θ|B) for θ ∈ {H,L}.
In contrast, the willingness to pay of a null type is equal to zero, independently of the state of demand:
v(∅|σ)=0for σ ∈ {G,B}.
To reduce the number of parameters in our model, we focus attention on two polar cases: vertical and
horizontal demand shifts.
Horizontal Demand Shift. In this case, each consumer’s willingness to pay is independent of the
demand state, but the total mass of high types is strictly larger in the good demand state than
in the bad state. That is, v(θ|σ) is independent of σ,a n dm(H|G) >m (H|B).W e c a n t h u s
normalize the willingness to pay of theh i g ht y p e( i nb o t hd e m a n ds t a t e s )t o1, and denote the
willingness to pay of the low type by v(L) ∈ (0,1).
Vertical Demand Shift. In this case, the mass of each consumer type is independent of the demand
state, but each type’s willingness to pay is strictly higher in the good demand state than in the
bad state. That is, m(θ|σ) is independent of σ,a n dv(θ|G) >v (θ|B) for θ ∈ {H,L}.W ec a nt h u s
normalize the total mass of consumers with positive valuation to 1, and denote the mass of high
types (in both demand states) by m(H). The mass of low types is then given by 1 − m(H).
Before making his purchasing decision, each consumer observes a signal s about the underlying
aggregate demand state. We consider two information structures:
1. Each consumer only observes his own valuation, i.e., s = v(θ|σ), and updates his beliefs about the
demand state σ using Bayes’ rule. This information structure is explored in section 3.
2. Each consumer directly observes the true state of demand, i.e., s = σ ∈ {G,B}. This information
structure is explored in sections 4 and 5.
The Monopolist’s Strategies. The monopolist can produce any amount of the homogeneous good at
constant marginal cost c. For simplicity, we set c =0 . The monopolist can sell the product over two
periods, t =1 ,2. (We will also discuss the more general case, where the good can be sold over T ≥ 2
periods.) Before the demand state is realized, she sets prices p1 and p2 for periods 1 and 2, respectively.
In addition, she can commit to a capacity for period 1, k1, and to a total capacity (for both periods),
4k ≥ k1. Ex ante, the monopolist thus sets an overall capacity k, and may commit not to sell more than
a certain fraction of this capacity (namely, k1 units) in t =1 . Any capacity unsold in the ﬁrst period,
is then available in t =2 . (One extreme interpretation, consistent with our assumptions, is that the
monopolist has to produce all k units before the state of the world is realized.) By setting a price pt
and a capacity, the monopolist commits to serving all demand up to capacity at price pt.T h e r ea r en o
capacity costs. (This is, admittedly, a strong assumption, which we discuss further in the conclusion.)
Following Dana (2001), we assume that prices and capacities cannot be conditioned on the state of
demand σ. Our model thus only applies to those industries, where the identity of consumers is unknown
(to the monopolist) ahead of time, and so forward contracts with consumers cannot be written.
Depending on the intertemporal proﬁle of prices, we can distinguish between three diﬀerent types of
pricing strategies:
Uniform pricing. The monopolist sets prices such that, with probability 1, all items are sold at the
same price. In particular, setting the same price in both periods, p1 = p2,i sau n i f o r mp r i c i n g
strategy.
Introductory Oﬀers. The monopolist sets a lower price in the ﬁrst period, p1 <p 2, and some units
are sold in each period with positive probability (that is, in at least one demand state).
Final Sales. The monopolist sets a lower price in the second period, p1 >p 2, and some units are sold
in each period with positive probability (that is, in at least one demand state).
Since consumers clearly prefer to purchase the good at the lowest possible price, an introductory
oﬀer strategy must have the property that ﬁrst-period capacity k1 is binding in at least one demand
state (otherwise all units would be sold at the low price in the ﬁrst period). Similarly, a ﬁnal sales
strategy must have the property that total capacity k is binding with positive probability (otherwise,
all consumers would always prefer to buy the good at the low price in the second period).
Consumer Rationing. Since the monopolist can commit to capacities, consumers may be rationed
in period 1, period 2, or both periods. Again following Dana (2001), we assume that rationing is
proportional (or random). Under the proportional rationing rule (see, for example, Beckmann (1965),
and Davidson and Deneckere (1986)), each consumer who is willing to purchase the good has the same
probability of obtaining the good. That is, if a mass m of consumers demand the good, but only a
quantity k<mis available, then each consumer — independently of his type — is served with probability
k/m. Note that this rationing rule is consistent with a queuing model, where consumers arrive in random
order, and consumers who arrive ﬁrst are served ﬁrst.
Consumer Equilibrium. Observing the monopolist’s strategy (p1,k 1,p 2,k) and their (private) signals
about the demand state σ, consumers make their purchasing decisions. For any (p1,k 1,p 2,k) and
distribution of signals, consumers thus play an anonymous game with discrete actions. A consumer
equilibrium is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of this (sub-)game. For p1 ≤ p2, consumers have a (weakly)
dominant strategy: “demand the good in the ﬁrst period if and only if your willingness to pay is equal
to or higher than p1; if you are rationed in the ﬁrst period, demand the good in the second period,
provided your valuation is at least p2.” Moreover, any consumer equilibrium is revenue equivalent for
the monopolist. In contrast, if the monopolist chooses a ﬁnal sales strategy (and so p1 >p 2), a consumer
may not have a dominant strategy. The only reason why consumers may be willing to buy the good at
the higher price in the ﬁrst period is that they expect to be rationed with a higher probability at the
lower price in the second period. However, if consumers expect that more consumers postpone their
purchase until t =2 , they expect a lower probability of rationing in the second period (as the monopolist
will sell all unsold units in the second period), and hence buying in the second period becomes more
attractive. This may give rise to the existence of multiple consumer equilibria with diﬀerent revenues.
5The best consumer equilibrium from the monopolist’s point of view (and the worst from the consumers’
point of view) is the one that maximizes sales at the high price (in t =1 ).
The Monopolist’s Maximization Problem. The monopolist optimally chooses her strategy (p1,k 1,p 2,k)
assuming that, in each subgame, consumers’ purchasing decisions form a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
To obtain a unique solution, we select, for each (ﬁnal sales) strategy of the monopolist, the best consumer
equilibrium (from the monopolist’s point of view).6
Remark 1 To understand the role of demand uncertainty for non-uniform pricing, suppose there are no
demand shocks, i.e., v(θ|σ) and m(θ|σ) are independent of the state of demand σ. To simplify notation,
we can then write consumer type θ’s valuation as v(θ), the mass of consumer type θ as m(θ),a n d
normalize the total mass of consumers with positive valuation to 1, so that m(L)=1−m(H). Consider
ﬁrst uniform pricing (i.e., p1 = p2). The optimal uniform price is equal to v(H) if m(H)v(H) ≥ v(L),
and equal to v(L) if m(H)v(H) ≤ v(L).T h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r o ﬁt from uniform pricing is thus given by
πU =m a x{m(H)v(H),v(L)}.
Next, consider introductory oﬀers (i.e., p1 <p 2). The only candidate equilibrium prices are p1 = v(L)
and p2 = v(H), and total capacity k ≥ 1.T h e p r o ﬁt with this pricing strategy — as a function of
ﬁrst-period capacity k1 — is then given by
πIO(k1)=v(L)k1 + v(H)(1 − k1)m(H),
which is linear in k1. That is, the optimal choice of ﬁrst-period capacity is k1 ∈ {0,1},w h i c hi s
equivalent to uniform pricing. Hence, the introductory oﬀer strategy is (weakly) dominated by uniform
pricing. Finally, consider the ﬁnal sales pricing strategy (i.e., p1 >p 2). Clearly, it is optimal to set
p2 = v(L), k1 = k ∈ [m(H),1],a n dp1 such that the high types are just indiﬀerent between buying in
p e r i o d1( w i t h o u tb e i n gr a t i o n e d ) ,a n db u y i n gi np e r i o d2( a n db e i n gr a t i o n e dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − [k −
m(H)]/[1 − m(H)]). The high type’s indiﬀerence condition can be written as












and the proﬁtb y
πFS(k)=p1(k)k + v(L)(k − m(H)).
Since the ﬁnal sales proﬁti sl i n e a ri nk, and we assumed m(H) ≤ k ≤ 1, the optimal capacity k is either
k = m(H) or k =1 . However, if k = m(H), then all capacity is sold at price v(H), and this strategy is
equivalent to setting a uniform price v(H).I f ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,k =1 ,t h e np1 = p2 = v(L),w h i c h
is a uniform pricing strategy. Hence, the uniform pricing strategy (weakly) dominates the ﬁnal sales
strategy.
6In Section 6, we consider a perturbation of the model, which introduces heterogeneity in consumers’ valuations. We











Strong horizontal demand shift
) | ( ) | (
) | ( ) | (
) | (
) | (
G L m G H m d
B L m B H m c
G H m b





Figure 1: Weak and strong horizontal demand shifts.
3 Pricing under Horizontal Demand Shifts when Consumers
only Learn their own Valuation
In this section, we analyze demand uncertainty when consumers do not directly observe the demand
state, but only their own valuation. That is, in demand state σ, each consumer of type θ observes
the signal s = v(θ|σ). Observing his own valuation, the consumer then updates his beliefs about the
demand state σ,u s i n gB a y e s ’r u l e .
Vertical demand shifts. Under vertical demand shifts, each consumer’s private signal s fully reveals
the state of demand σ (assuming that v(H|B) 6= v(L|G)). The analysis is thus identical to the one when
consumers directly observe the demand state. We analyze the case of vertical demand shifts in section
5.
Horizontal demand shifts. In this section, we thus restrict attention to horizontal demand shifts,
where a consumer’s private signal s does not fully reveal the demand state as v(θ|σ) is independent of
σ. Independently of the demand state, the willingness to pay of high type consumers is given by v(H),
which we normalize to 1, and the willingness to pay of low types by v(L) < 1. The number of consumers
of either type depend on the demand state. By assumption, the mass of high types and the total mass
of consumers is greater in the good demand state than in the bad demand state: m(H|G) ≥ m(H|B)
and m(H|G)+m(L|G) ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B) with at least one strict inequality.
In our analysis, we ﬁrst follow Dana (2001) in restricting attention to non-decreasing price paths, and
7compare introductory oﬀers with uniform pricing. Then, we also allow for decreasing price paths and
compare ﬁnal sales strategies with introductory oﬀers and uniform pricing. When analyzing ﬁnal sales
strategies, it is useful to distinguish between two demand regimes; see ﬁgure 1 for a graphic illustration.
• Weak horizontal demand shifts. In this case, the rightward shift of the demand curve is suﬃciently
small in the sense that the number of high type consumers in the good state is less than the total
number of consumers in the bad state, i.e., m(H|G) <m (L|B)+m(H|B).
• Strong horizontal demand shifts. In this case, the rightward shift of the demand curve is suﬃciently
large in the sense that the number of high type consumers in the good state is greater than the
total number of consumers in the bad state, i.e., m(H|G) >m (L|B)+m(H|B).
Uniform pricing versus introductory oﬀers. Let us ﬁrst consider uniform pricing, where the monop-
olist sets the same price p in both periods. Under uniform pricing, the monopolist has no incentive to
ration consumers, and will thus set capacities k = k1 = m(H|G)+m(L|G) so that demand can always
be met. Independently of his beliefs about the demand state (and the behavior of other consumers), a
consumer will optimally purchase the good (in either period 1 or 2) if and only if the price his lower
than his willingness to pay. We therefore do not need to consider consumers’ belief formation at this
point. Clearly, the monopolist will optimally extract all of the surplus from one of the two consumer





ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B) if p =1>v (L),
v(L)[ρ(m(H|G)+m(L|G))
+(1 − ρ)(m(H|B)+m(L|B))] if p = v(L).
The proﬁt maximizing uniform price is p = v(L) if
v(L){ρ[m(H|G)+m(L|G)] + (1 − ρ)[m(H|B)+m(L|B)]} >
ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B), (1)
and p =1if the reverse inequality holds.
Next, let us consider introductory oﬀers, where p1 <p 2. Independently of his beliefs, each consumer
has a dominant strategy, namely to demand the good at the low price in period 1, provided the price
is not higher than his willingness to pay. If the consumer is rationed at the low price, his dominant
strategy is to demand the good at the high price in period 2, provided again this price is less than his
valuation. In each period, the monopolist optimally extracts all of the surplus of some consumer type.
Under introductory oﬀers, the monopolist will therefore set prices p1 = v(L) and p2 =1 . Without loss
of generality, we can assume that ﬁrst-period capacity k1 ≤ m(H|G)+m(L|G). Expected proﬁts are
then given by
πIO(v(L),1,k 1)


















Hence, the unique candidate for an optimal introductory oﬀer strategy is p1 = v(L), p2 =1and










Note that introductory oﬀers are dominated by uniform pricing if total demand does not expand
in the good demand state, i.e., m(H|G)+m(L|G)=m(H|B)+m(L|B).I f m(H|G)+m(L|G) >
m(H|B)+m(L|B), however, then introductory oﬀers may be more proﬁtable than uniform pricing








Furthermore, we ﬁnd that πIO(v(L),1,m(H|B)+m(L|B)) >π U(v(L)) is equivalent to
m(H|G) > [m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L). (4)
The latter condition says that, in the good state, uniform pricing with the high price (p =1 )i sm o r e
proﬁtable than with the low price (p = v(L)). Clearly, for these two conditions to hold simultaneously
it is necessary that
m(H|B) < [m(H|B)+m(L|B)]v(L) (5)
which says that in the bad demand state uniform pricing with the low price (p = v(L))i sm o r ep r o ﬁtable
than with the high price (p =1 ). Conditions (4) and (5) are thus necessary (but not suﬃcient) for
introductory oﬀers to dominate uniform pricing.7
Remark 2 Introductory oﬀer strategies are optimal among the set of strategies with p1 ≤ p2 if condi-
tions (3) and (4) are satisﬁed.
Hence, as in the case of vertical demand shifts, the monopolist operates in an environment in which
introductory oﬀers can be an optimal strategy if ﬁnal sales strategies are excluded from the analysis, as
in Dana (2001).
Consumer learning. So far, we have only considered non-decreasing price paths, where consumers
have a (weakly) dominant strategy that is independent of their beliefs about the state of demand. If
p1 >p 2, however, those consumers whose willingness to pay exceeds the high ﬁrst-period price do not
have a dominant strategy. Since the distribution of consumer types varies with the state of demand,
a consumer’s best reply to the purchasing strategies of other consumers will generally depend on his
beliefs about the state of demand. Learning his own willingness to pay, a Bayesian consumer uses this
information to update his beliefs about the underlying state of the world. However, in the case of
horizontal demand shifts, a consumer’s private signal is not perfectly revealing.8
7If (4) and (5) are satisﬁed and the probability of the good demand state ρ is chosen suﬃciently small (holding all
other variables ﬁxed), then uniform pricing is dominated by introductory oﬀers.
8Since the total mass of high and low type consumers may be larger in the good demand state than in the bad demand
state, m(H|G)+m(L|G) ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B), we introduce the construct of a “null type” so as to be able to use Bayes’
rule. Recall that a null type has a valuation of zero, and is thus not willing to buy at any (positive) price. The mass
of null types in demand state σ is the diﬀerence between the total mass and the mass of high and low type consumers,
m(∅|σ)=M − [m(H|σ)+m(L|σ)] ≥ 0. That is, while the total mass of high, low, and null types is independent of the
demand state, the shares of the diﬀerent types are state-dependent
9The probability of being a consumer of type θ ∈ {L,H,∅}, given that the demand state is σ ∈ {G,B},





The unconditional probability of a good (bad) demand state is given by Q(G)=ρ (Q(B)=1−ρ), and









A consumer who learns that he has a high valuation, will then (using Bayes’ rule) compute the probability








Final sales. Let us now consider ﬁnal sales strategies, where p1 >p 2. Since consumers cannot
condition their purchasing decision on the state of the world, but only on their own valuation, any
optimal ﬁnal sales strategy must have the property that all high type consumers demand the good
in the ﬁrst period, while all low types demand the good in the second period (and are rationed with
positive probability). Hence, it is suﬃcient to consider the family of ﬁnal sales strategies (parameterized
by capacity k), (b p1(k),v(L),k),w h e r eb p1(k) i ss e ts oa st om a k eh i g ht y p ec o n s u m e r sj u s ti n d i ﬀerent
between demanding the good in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da tp r i c eb p1(k), and postponing the purchase (so as to
demand the good in the second period at price v(L)). For k ≥ m(H|G),t h ei n d i ﬀerence condition can
be written as














where min{[k − m(H|σ)/m(L|σ)],1} is the probability of obtaining the good at the low price in demand
state σ.( F o rk<m (H|G), rationing occurs even at the high price. This case is considered in the proof
of proposition 5.)
Strong horizontal demand shifts. Suppose ﬁrst that horizontal demand shifts are strong, and so
m(H|G) ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B). In section 5, we have shown that the ﬁnal sales strategy (p1,p 2,k)=
(1,v(L),m(H|G)) dominates any introductory oﬀer strategy that itself is not dominated by a uniform
pricing strategy. Under the information structure considered here, however, a ﬁnal sales strategy with
p1 =1and k>m (H|B) is not viable: if a consumer who has learnt that that he has a high valuation
(v(H)=1 )b u y si nt h eﬁrst period, he gets zero rents; if, however, he waits and demands the good
at a lower price in the second period, he will obtain the good with positive probability, even if all
other high types buy the good in the ﬁrst period (in which case, k − m(H|B) units remain for sale
at the low price in the bad demand state). Let us therefore now consider the ﬁnal sales strategy





10The monopolist expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y
πFS(b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G))
= b p1(m(H|G))[ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)] + (1 − ρ)v(L)m(L|B)
= ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B) − (1 − ρ)m(H|B)[1 − v(L)] + (1 − ρ)v(L)m(L|B)
= ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)v(L)[m(L|B)+m(H|B)] (7)
Note that the ﬁnal sales strategy (b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) induces intertemporal price dispersion
in the bad demand state: all high type consumers buy the good in the ﬁrst period, and all low type
consumers demand the good in the second period. (The same happens in the good demand state, but
there is no residual supply at the low price.)
We can now compare the ﬁnal sales strategy (b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) with uniform prices p =1
and p = v(L).T h eﬁnal sales strategy is more proﬁtable than the uniform price of v(L) if and only if
equation (4) holds. This condition says that, conditional on demand being in the good state, the best
uniform price is 1.T h eﬁnal sales strategy is more proﬁtable than the uniform price of 1 if and only if
equation (5) holds. This condition says that, conditional on demand being in the bad state, the best
uniform price is v(L). Recall that equations (4) and (5) are necessary conditions for introductory oﬀers
to be more proﬁtable than uniform pricing. The results can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 1 Under strong horizontal demand shifts, uniform pricing is optimal amongst all pricing strate-
gies if conditions (4) or (5) do not hold. If both conditions hold, then uniform pricing is dominated by
the ﬁnal sales strategy (b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)).
The non-optimality of introductory oﬀers. Comparing the introductory oﬀer strategy with the ﬁ-
nal sales strategy, we ﬁnd that πFS(b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) >π IO(v(L),1,m(H|B)+m(L|B)) is
equivalent to m(H|G) > [m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L), which is exactly condition (4). On the other hand, if
condition (4) does not hold, then we have already seen that the uniform price of v(L) is more proﬁtable
than the introductory oﬀers strategy (v(L),1,m(H|B)+m(L|B)). Hence, introductory oﬀers are domi-
nated by either the uniform pricing strategy with p = v(L) or the ﬁnal sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)).
Lemma 2 Under strong horizontal demand shifts, the proﬁt-maximizing pricing strategy involves a
non-increasing price path, p1 ≥ p2. If conditions (4) or (5) hold, ﬁnal sales are optimal, and hence
p1 >p 2.
Weak horizontal demand shifts. Suppose now that horizontal demand shifts are weak, and so
m(H|G) <m (H|B)+m(L|B). Let us consider the ﬁnal sales strategy (b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B)),v(L),
m(H|B)+m(L|B)),w h e r eﬁrst-period price b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B)) is given by
b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B))
= v(L)+[ 1− v(L)]Q(G|H)
µ






= ρ{b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B))m(H|G)+v(L)[m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G)]}







[m(H|G)+m(L|G) − m(H|B) − m(L|B)].( 8 )
11The optimal pricing strategy under weak horizontal demand shifts. Next, we show that intro-
ductory oﬀer strategies are never optimal under weak demand shifts, assuming that the monopo-
list can use also use ﬁnal sales strategies. Recall that the only possibly optimal introductory oﬀer
strategy is (v(L),1,m(H|B)+m(L|B)). As we have shown above, it is (weakly) dominated by the
uniform price p = v(L) if and only if equation (4) does not hold, i.e., if and only if m(H|G) ≤
[m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L). We now analyze under which condition the ﬁnal sales strategy with in-
tertemporal price dispersion dominates the introductory oﬀer strategy. It is straightforward to show
that πFS(b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B)),v(L),m(H|B)+m(L|B)) >π IO(v(L),1,m(H|B)+m(L|B)) if and
only if equation (4) holds, i.e., if and only if m(H|G) > [m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L). Hence, the introduc-
tory oﬀer strategy is either dominated by uniform pricing with p = v(L) or by the ﬁnal sales strategy
(pG
1 ,v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)).
Lemma 3 Under weak horizontal demand shifts, the proﬁt-maximizing pricing strategy involves a non-
increasing price path, p1 ≥ p2.
Horizontal demand shifts: main results. We summarize our ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that consumers only learn their own type before making their purchasing de-
cision. Then, under horizontal demand shifts, the optimal strategy of the monopolist involves non-
increasing price paths, p1 ≥ p2.
Above, we have only considered two ﬁnal sales strategies, namely (b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) in
the case of strong horizontal demand shifts, and (b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B)),v(L),m(H|B)+m(L|B)) in
the case of weak horizontal demand shifts. Are these the only potentially optimal ﬁnal sales strategies?
This is addressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that consumers only learn their own type before making their purchasing de-
cision. Under strong horizontal demand shifts, the only potentially optimal ﬁnal sales strategy is
(b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)). Under weak horizontal demand shifts, the only potentially optimal ﬁnal
sales strategy are (b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) and (b p1(m(H|B)+m(L|B)),v(L),m(H|B)+m(L|B)).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the model considered here, any ﬁnal sales strategy with k>m (H|B) induces intertemporal
price dispersion: if k>m (H|B), a measure of at least m(H|B) of consumers buys at the high price;
in addition, when demand is in the bad state, a measure k − m(H|B) purchases the good at the
low price. Hence, any optimal ﬁnal sales strategy leads to intertemporal price dispersion in the bad
demand state. Furthermore, under weak horizontal demand shifts, ﬁnal sales strategy (b p1(m(H|B)+
m(L|B)),v(L),m(H|B)+m(L|B)) induces price dispersion in both demand states.
Strategy space. It is possible to show that the monopolist cannot do better by charging more than
two prices. Essentially, the argument is that a consumer of a given type cannot condition his purchasing
decision on the state of demand. Moreover, all consumers of the same type have the same willingness to
pay and the same beliefs about the state of demand. Since there are two consumer types with positive
valuation, the monopolist does not need to charge more than two prices.
4 Pricing under Horizontal Demand Shifts when Consumers
Know the Demand State
In the previous section, we have assumed that consumers only observe their own valuation before
making their ﬁrst-period purchasing decision. Here we consider an alternative information structure:
12Consumers learn the state of the world before making their purchasing decisions, i.e., each consumer
observes the signal s = σ. We maintain our assumption that the monopolist has to commit to prices
and capacities before the state of the world is realized.9 This new information structure implies a
strong (informational) asymmetry between the monopolist and the consumers. This asymmetry may
be motivated by the existence of a time lag between the monopolist’s pricing and capacity decision and
consumers’ purchasing decisions. Below, we show that our previous results are (qualitatively) robust to
such a change in the information structure.
Uniform pricing and introductory oﬀer strategies are not aﬀected by the change in the information
structure since each consumer has a (weakly) dominant strategy which does not depend on the state of
demand. It remains to analyze ﬁnal sales strategies.
Final sales strategies. Let us now consider ﬁnal sales strategies, where p1 >p 2. Recall that the
monopolist has no incentive to restrict sales at the high price; this implies k1 = k. Assume that
the monopolist sets capacity k such that m(H|σ) <k<m (H|σ)+m(L|σ) for some demand state σ
Furthermore, suppose that prices are such that, in demand state σ, all high type consumers buy the
good in the ﬁrst period, while all low type consumers demand the good in the second period. Hence,
in state σ, those consumers who decide to purchase in the second period are rationed with probability
1 − [k − m(H|σ)]/m(L|σ). A consumer with reservation value b v is then indiﬀerent between purchasing
t h eg o o di np e r i o d1a n dd e l a y i n gt h ep u r c h a s ei f
b v − p1 =
k − m(H|σ)
m(L|σ)
(b v − p2).
Clearly, the monopolist will optimally set prices such that, in some demand state σ,h i g ht y p ec o n s u m e r s
are just indiﬀerent between purchasing the good at the high price and trying to purchase at the low
price (but risking not to obtain the good), i.e., b v =1 . Moreover, any optimal ﬁnal sales strategy has
the property that the monopolist extracts all the rents from the low types: p2 = v(L). (To see this,
note that if the monopolist charged a higher price in the second period, she would never serve any low
type consumers; but for serving only high types, it would be optimal to charge a uniform price of 1.I f
the monopolist charged a price p2 <v (L), then she could increase her proﬁtb yr a i s i n gp2: all low types
would still demand the good in the second period, and the high types would ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to
purchase at the high ﬁrst-period price.) Hence, if the monopolist wants to make high type consumers
indiﬀerent between purchasing and delaying purchase in demand state σ, she will optimally set the

















1(k) is (linearly) decreasing in k,p r o v i d e dt h a tm(H|σ)+m(L|σ) >k>m (H|σ).A st h e
monopolist raises total capacity, the probability of rationing in the second period decreases. Hence,
the ﬁrst-period price has to be reduced to make high type consumers indiﬀerent between purchasing in
period 1 and postponing demand to period 2.
Suppose that the monopolist sets p1 = pσ
1(k) and p2 = v(L), and thus makes, in demand state σ,
all high types indiﬀerent between purchasing now and purchasing later. Since she cannot condition the
ﬁrst-period price on the demand state, the following question then arises: In demand state σ0 6= σ,w i l l
high type consumers purchase the good in the ﬁrst period or delay purchase?
9If we allowed the monopolist to condition prices and capacities on the state of demand, we could analyze the pricing
problem for each demand state separately. In this case, the results from the monopoly problem under demand certainty
apply. In particular, from Ferguson (1994), we know that the optimal pricing strategy with non-decreasing price paths is
revenue equivalent to the optimal pricing strategy with non-increasing price paths. Hence, this model does not predict as
to when we should observe ﬁnal sales rather than introductory oﬀers (and vice versa).
13Lemma 6 Suppose capacity k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|G)+m(L|G)). Then, pG
1 (k) >p B
1 (k). That is, if the
monopolist sets prices such that the high types are just willing to buy the good in the ﬁrst period when
demand is good, then the high types will delay consumption in the bad state. On the other hand, if prices
are such that the high types are just willing to buy the good in the ﬁrst period when the demand state is
bad, then they will do so also when the demand state is good.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, demand is “greater” in the good demand state than in the bad demand state, which
implies that the probability of being rationed in the second period (assuming that all high types buy in
the ﬁrst period, and all low types in the second) is higher in the good demand state. (This holds even
though the mass of low types may be greater in the bad demand state.)
Strong horizontal demand shifts. Suppose that demand shocks are strong in that m(H|G) ≥
m(H|B)+m(L|B).
Uniform pricing versus ﬁnal sales. Consider the ﬁnal sales strategy where the high consumer type
is made indiﬀerent between purchasing in the ﬁrst period and delaying purchase; that is, suppose
p1 = pG
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if m(H|G)+m(L|G) ≥ k
≥ m(H|G)
ρk +( 1− ρ)[m(H|B)+m(L|B)]v(L) if m(H|G) ≥ k
≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B)
ρk +( 1− ρ)kv(L) if m(H|B)+m(L|B) ≥
k>m (H|B)
k if k ≤ m(H|B)
The proﬁtf u n c t i o ne π
FS is piece-wise linear in capacity k; it is continuous, except at k = m(H|B),
where it has a downward jump. To understand the diﬀerent pieces of the proﬁt function, note that (i)
all low types always demand the good in the second period at price v(L); (ii) in the good state, the
high types demand the good in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da tp r i c epG
1 (k) (which is equal to 1 if k ≤ m(H|G)); (iii)
in the bad state, high type consumers demand the good in the second period at price v(L),p r o v i d e d
that k>m (H|B).H o w e v e r ,i fk ≤ m(H|B), then all high types demand the good in the ﬁrst period at
price pG
1 (k)=1even when the state of demand is bad (since a high type who decided to deviate and
purchase the good in the second period would be rationed with probability 1). This gives rise to the
discontinuity of the proﬁt function at k = m(H|B).
Note that e π
FS is increasing on each of the four linear pieces, except possibly on the piece where k ≥
m(H|G). Consequently, there are only two possible interior solutions: k = m(H|B) and k = m(H|G).
However, for k = m(H|B), all items are sold in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da tp r i c epG
1 (k)=1 ;t h i ss t r a t e g yi s
(strictly) dominated by a uniform price of 1. The unique candidate is thus k = m(H|G); the associated
prices are p1 =1and p2 = v(L).T h i sﬁnal sales strategy yields expected proﬁts of
e π
FS(m(H|G)) = ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)[m(H|B)+m(L|B)]v(L). (10)
An alternative ﬁnal sales strategy consists in charging pB
1 (k) in the ﬁr s tp e r i o ds oa st om a k et h e
high type indiﬀerent between purchasing in the ﬁrst period and postponing purchase. It can be shown
that this strategy is dominated by either the ﬁnal sales strategy considered above or uniform pricing.
We thus have the following result.
Lemma 7 Under strong horizontal demand shifts, the unique candidate for an optimal ﬁnal sales strat-
egy is p1 =1 , p2 = v(L),a n dk = m(H|G).
14Proof. See Appendix.
This proﬁti st h es a m ea sf o rt h eﬁnal sales strategy (b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) analyzed in section
3 (see equation (7)). We can thus conclude that introductory oﬀer strategies are never optimal under
strong horizontal demand shifts.
Rationing rule. To what extent are our results driven by the assumption of proportional rationing?
Suppose instead that consumers are rationed according to a diﬀerent rule when the monopolist uses
a ﬁnal sales strategy. Recall that, in our model with vertical demand shifts, any optimal ﬁnal sales
strategy has the property that the rent of some consumer type is fully extracted at the high price.
Consequently, this consumer type is only willing to purchase at the high price if delaying consumption
leads to rationing with probability 1. Hence, the chosen rationing rule is immaterial to the proﬁtability
of the relevant ﬁnal sales strategies in the model with vertical demand shift. In contrast, proﬁts derived
from the use of introductory oﬀer strategies are typically not neutral to the rationing rule. For example,
if rationing is eﬃcient introductory oﬀers cannot dominate uniform pricing. More generally, any increase
in the probability of serving low types relative to high types reduces the proﬁt from a given introductory
oﬀer strategy. We call a rationing rule positively selective if a high type consumer is at least as likely
as a low type consumer to obtain the good in case of excess demand. Under such a rationing rule,
introductory oﬀers are always dominated.10
Weak horizontal demand shifts. Suppose now that demand shocks are “weak” in that m(H|G) <
m(H|B)+m(L|B).
As in the case of strong demand shifts, the optimal second period price is p2 = v(L) and the optimal
ﬁrst period price is set such that in one of the demand states high type consumers are just willing to
purchase in the ﬁrst period. Hence, we can conﬁne attention to two families of ﬁnal sales strategies










,w h e r eﬁrst period prices
pG
1 (k) and pB
1 (k) are given by equation (9).
Uniform pricing versus ﬁnal sales. Observing that proﬁts from ﬁnal sales strategies are piece-
wise linear in k, we can reduce the number of potentially optimal ﬁnal sales strategies to three:
(1,v(L),m(H|G)), (pG






Comparing the third of these strategies with uniform pricing, we ﬁnd that the ﬁnal sales strategy is
always dominated. That is, it is never optimal to make the high types indiﬀerent between purchasing in
the ﬁrst period and delaying purchase when demand is in the bad state. We thus obtain the following
result.
Lemma 8 Under weak horizontal demand shifts, all ﬁnal sales strategies except (1,v(L),m(H|G)) and
(pG
1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)),v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)) are never optimal.
Proof. See Appendix
Recall that the ﬁrst of these two ﬁnal sales strategies, (1,v(L),m(H|G)), is the only potentially
optimal ﬁnal sales strategy under strong horizontal demand shifts. It results in an expected proﬁto f
πFS(1,v(L),m(H|G)) = m(H|G)[ρ +( 1− ρ)v(L)]. Note that this strategy induces price dispersion of
posted prices but not of prices at which transactions occur: in the good demand state, all items are sold
at price 1, while in the bade demand state, all items are sold at price v(L). In contrast, the ﬁnal sales
strategy (pG
1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)),v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)) induces true intertemporal price dispersion
i nt h eg o o dd e m a n ds t a t e( w h e nm(H|G) units are sold at price pG
1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)) in the ﬁrst
period, and m(L|B)+m(H|B)−m(H|G) units at price v(L) in the second period). We call this strategy
10Under a negatively selective rationing rule, introductory oﬀers may be optimal. For example, in the extreme case
where low types are served ﬁrst, an introductory oﬀer strategy could perfectly price discriminate between the two types
of consumers when demand is certain. By continuity, if one of the states is highly likely, introductory oﬀers would be
optimal also under demand uncertainty.















under the information structure analyzed in sec-
tion 3, where consumers do not directly observe the state of the world before making their purchasing
decision (see equation (8)). We can thus conclude that introductory oﬀer strategies are never optimal
under weak horizontal demand shifts.
Next we give conditions which ensure that the proﬁt-maximizing price path is strictly decreasing.
Final sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)) dominates the uniform price p =1if and only if
m(H|G)v(L) >m (H|B), (11)
and the uniform price p = v(L) if and only if
ρ{m(H|G) − [m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L)}
> (1 − ρ){[m(H|B)+m(L|B)] − m(H|G)}v(L). (12)
Note that (4) is a necessary condition for the latter equation to hold. Ceteris paribus, condition (12)
is more diﬃcult to be satisﬁed, the smaller is ρ and the larger is m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G).F i n a l
sales strategy (pG
1 ,v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)) dominates the uniform price with p = v(L) if and only if
condition (4) holds. Hence, for (pG
1 ,v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)) to dominate all uniform pricing strategies,
it is suﬃcient that (i) condition (4) holds, and (ii) that the uniform price p = v(L) is more proﬁtable
than the uniform price p =1 ; (ii) holds if (1) is satisﬁed.11 We thus have the following suﬃcient
conditions for the non-optimality of uniform pricing.
Remark 3 Suppose horizontal demand shifts are weak. If either conditions (11) and (12) or conditions
(4) and (1) hold, then the proﬁt-maximizing price path is strictly decreasing, p1 >p 2.
C o m b i n i n gl e m m a2a n dr e m a r k3t h u sg i v e ss u ﬃcient conditions for the optimality of ﬁnal sales
strategies.
Horizontal demand shifts: main results. Summarizing our results on decreasing price paths
under strong and weak demand shifts (Lemmas 2 and 3), we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 9 In the model with horizontal demand shifts, the optimal strategy of the monopolist
involves non-increasing price paths, p1 ≥ p2.
11As u ﬃcient condition (which is also necessary if m(H|G)+m(L|G)=m(H|B)] +m(L|B))f o rt h eﬁnal sales strategy
to dominate the uniform price p =1is given by
[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]v(L) > (1 − ρ)m(H|B)+ρm(H|G).
The necessary and suﬃcient condition is rather involved and not very helpful. Note that the left-hand side of the above
inequality is less than or equal to
(1 − ρ)[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]v(L)+ρ[m(L|G)+m(H|G)]v(L).
Hence, the necessary condition implies that the uniform price p = v(L) dominates the uniform price p =1(see inequality
(1)). For the ﬁnal sales strategy to dominate both uniform prices, (4) and (1) are therefore weaker necessary conditions
than (4) and the above equation.
16Under horizontal demand shifts, introductory oﬀers cannot be optimal if one allows for ﬁnal sales
strategies.
Conditions for the optimality of intertemporal price dispersion Concluding our analysis of horizontal
demand shifts, we now establish under which conditions the optimal pricing strategy induces intertempo-
ral price discrimination. To this end, we have to show that the ﬁnal sales strategy (pG
1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)),
v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)) is indeed optimal for some parameter conﬁgurations.
Proposition 10 In the model with horizontal demand shifts, the monopolist’s optimal pricing involves
intertemporal price dispersion if the following conditions hold:
1. m(H|B)+m(L|B) >m (H|G),
2. m(H|G) > [m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L) >m (H|G)[ρ +( 1− ρ)v(L)],a n d
3. (1 − ρ){[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]v(L) − m(H|B)} ≥ ρ{m(H|G) − [m(L|G)+m(H|G)]v(L)}.
Proof. First, recall that (pG
1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)),v(L),m(L|B)+m(H|B)) can only be optimal under
weak demand shifts. (This is the ﬁrst condition.) Second, the ﬁnal sales strategy with intertemporal price
dispersion dominates the introductory oﬀer strategy if and only if equation (4) holds, i.e., m(H|G) >
[m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L). Moreover, it dominates the ﬁnal sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G) if and only if
[m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L) >m (H|G)[ρ +( 1− ρ)v(L)].
(The two inequalities are summarized by the second condition.) Third, the uniform price p = v(L)
performs better than the uniform price p =1if and only if the third condition holds. The uniform price
p = v(L) is in turn dominated by the ﬁnal sales strategy (pG
1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)),v(L),m(L|B)+
m(H|B)) if and only if the ﬁrst inequality in the second condition holds.
The necessary conditions for intertemporal price dispersion can be understood as follows. The ﬁrst
condition says that demand shifts are weak. The ﬁrst inequality in the second condition says that, in
t h eg o o dd e m a n ds t a t e ,t h eu n i f o r mp r i c ep =1is more proﬁtable than the uniform price p = v(L).T h e
second inequality says that it is more proﬁtable to serve m(H|G)+m(L|G) consumers at price p = v(L)
than to serve only m(H|G) consumers at price p =1with probability ρ and at price p = v(L) with
the remaining probability. The third condition ensures that uniform pricing with p = v(L) dominates
uniform pricing with p =1 . Ceteris paribus, the smaller is the probability of the good demand state ρ,
the “more likely” is it that the second and third conditions are satisﬁed. It is easily veriﬁed that the
example in the introduction satisﬁes all of these conditions.
Strategy space. In our model, we assumed that prices and capacities could only be set for two periods.
That is, we restricted the monopolist to selecting prices p1 and p2, ﬁrst-period capacity k1,a n dt o t a l
capacity k ≥ k1. An interesting question is whether our results still hold for an extended strategy space,
where the monopolist can set price pt and capacity kt ≥ kt−1 in any period t =1 ,...,T,w h e r eT ≥ 2.
In the case of strong horizontal demand shifts, the answer is aﬃrmative:
Lemma 11 Consider an extended strategy space in which for any ﬁnite number of periods T the mo-
nopolist sets prices and capacities. Then, under strong horizontal demand shifts, an optimal strategy in
the two-period model remains optimal in the T-period extension, T>2.
Proof. See Appendix.
However, in the case of weak horizontal demand shifts, allowing for more-than-two price strategies
changes the picture. In addition to ﬁnal sales or uniform pricing, a hybrid strategy which combines ﬁnal
sales with introductory oﬀers can be optimal.
17Lemma 12 Consider an extended strategy space in which for any ﬁnite number of periods T the mo-
nopolist sets prices and capacities. Then, under weak horizontal demand shifts, there exists a potentially






All other strategies with more than two diﬀerent prices (at which transactions occur with positive prob-
ability) cannot be optimal.12
Proof. See Appendix.
This three-price strategy is a hybrid between a ﬁnal sales and an introductory oﬀer strategy: in the
good state, all high-type consumers buy in period 1, while in the bad state, all consumers demand the
good in period 2. Among the consumers rationed in the second period, those with a high valuation buy
the good in period 3. Because of the use of introductory oﬀers in the bad state, we observe intertemporal
price dispersion.
This means that there exist only one potentially optimal strategy with more than two prices: (p1 =
1,p 2 = v(L),p 3 =1 ,k 1 = k2 = m(H|G),k ≥ m(H|G)+e m). Clearly this strategy dominates the ﬁnal
sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)), which was shown to be optimal under some parameter constellations
in the two-period model. We thus have established the following result.
Proposition 13 Consider an extended strategy space in which for any ﬁnite number of periods T,t h e
monopolist sets prices and capacities. Under weak horizontal demand shifts, the optimal strategy is either
uniform pricing, ﬁnal sales with intertemporal price dispersion, or a hybrid strategy with intertemporal
price dispersion.
The conditions for the optimality of a strategy with intertemporal price dispersion are weaker than
in the two-period model. Note that our analysis reveals that the optimal number of periods needed to
implement an optimal strategy can be larger than the number of demand states. This is in contrast to
Dana (2001), where price paths are restricted to be non-decreasing.
5 Pricing under Vertical Demand Shifts
In this section, we analyze demand uncertainty in the form of vertical demand shifts. Under vertical
demand shifts, the reservation values of the diﬀerent consumer types depend on the state of the world,
whereas the number of consumers of each type is independent of the state of demand. Assuming that
v(H|B) 6= v(L|G), a consumer who learns that his own valuation is given by v(θ|σ) > 0, θ ∈ {H,L},
will rationally infer that the demand state is σ with probability 1. Consequently, under vertical demand
12Ad i ﬀerent three price strategy, (p1 =1 ,p 2 = pB
1 (m(H|G)),p 3 = v(L),k 1 = k2 = k = m(H|G)), may also seem to
be potentially optimal. This three-price strategy is a sophisticated ﬁnal sales strategy: in the good state all high type
consumers buy in period 1 because any deviating consumer is rationed with probability 1. In the bad state, all high-type
consumers buy in period 2. Any high-type consumer is indiﬀerent between buying in period 2 at the price pB
1 (m(H|G))
and buying at a lower price in period 3 in which there is rationing with positive probability. Clearly, all low type consumer
demand the good in period 3. Although both strategies generate the same revenues in the good state (so that one might
think that this state is irrelevant for a proﬁt comparison) the two strategies are not revenue equivalent (which might
be a bit surprising in light of Ferguson, 1994). The reason is that the presence of the good state imposes restrictions
on the capacities. With the introductory oﬀer more units can be sold in the bad state than with a ﬁnal sales strategy
targeted for the bad state, when respecting the capacity restriction arising from selling at the high price in the good
state. It can be shown that the hybrid strategy gives higher proﬁts than the three-price ﬁnal sales strategy if and only if
[m(H|B)+m(L|B)]v(L) >m (H|B). This is equivalent to the condition that uniform pricing with p =1is dominated by
any of the two strategies. Hence, the three-price ﬁnal sales strategy cannot be optimal (for details see the proof of Lemma
12).
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Figure 2: Weak and strong vertical demand shifts.
shifts, private signals perfectly reveal the state of the world (except for null types), and our analysis
does not depend on whether consumers directly observe the demand state, or only their own valuation.
We normalize the total mass of consumers to 1. The mass of high type consumers is m(H) and the
mass of low type consumers m(L)=1− m(H).B yd e ﬁnition, the reservation value of each consumer
type is higher in the good demand state than in the bad demand state, i.e., v(θ|G) >v (θ|B), θ = L,H.
Moreover, in each demand state, high type consumers have a higher willingness to pay than low type
consumers: v(H|σ) >v (L|σ), σ = B,G.
It is useful to distinguish between two demand regimes; see ﬁgure 2 for an illustration.
• Weak vertical demand shifts. In this case, the upward shift of the demand curve is suﬃciently
small in the sense that high type consumers in the bad state have a higher willingness to pay than
low type consumers in the good state, i.e., v(H|B) >v (L|G).
• Strong vertical demand shifts. In this case, the upward shift of the demand curve is suﬃciently
large in the sense that high type consumers in the bad state have a lower willingness to pay than
low type consumers in the good state, i.e., v(H|B) <v (L|G).
Weak vertical demand shifts. Suppose that demand shocks are suﬃciently weak so that v(H|B) >
v(L|G).
Uniform pricing versus introductory oﬀers. First, we consider uniform pricing, where the monopolist
s e t st h es a m ep r i c ep in both periods. Since the monopolist does not attempt to discriminate between
consumer types or demand states, she has no incentive to ration consumers. Under uniform pricing, the
19monopolist thus sets capacities k1 = k =1so as to always meet demand. Moreover, the monopolist will
set the price so as to fully extract the rent of some consumer type in some demand state. We can thus





ρm(H)v(H|G) if p = v(H|G),
m(H)v(H|B) if p = v(H|B),
[(1 − ρ)m(H)+ρ]v(L|G) if p = v(L|G),
v(L|B) if p = v(L|B).
Second, we consider introductory oﬀers, where p1 <p 2. Clearly, consumers will only be willing to
purchase at the higher price in the second period if they have been unable to obtain the good in the
ﬁrst period. An introductory oﬀer strategy is thus based on consumer rationing at the low price in some
demand state. This requires the monopolist to set ﬁrst-period capacity 0 <k 1 < 1. On the other hand,
the monopolist has no incentive to ration consumers at the high price. She thus sets total capacity
k =1so as to always meet demand in the second period. An introductory oﬀer strategy can therefore
be summarized by the triplet (p1,p 2,k 1), where we suppress capacity k =1for notational simplicity.
Note that we can restrict attention to prices v(L|B), v(H|B), v(L|G),a n dv(H|G) since, in each period,
the monopolist optimally extracts all of the surplus from some consumer type in some demand state.
Lemma 14 Suppose vertical demand shifts are weak. Introductory oﬀers diﬀerent from (v(L|G), v(H|G),
m(H)) cannot be optimal among the set of strategies with non-decreasing price paths.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma says that either a uniform price or the introductory oﬀer strategy (v(L|G),v(H|G),m(H))
is optimal among the set of strategies with p1 ≤ p2. Under the introductory oﬀer strategy, the ﬁrst-
period capacity k1 = m(H) is always sold at price v(L|G). In the good demand state, those high type
consumers who did not obtain the good in the ﬁrst period, purchase it in the second period at price
v(H|G); since the probability of rationing in the ﬁrst period is m(H) and there are m(H) high type
consumers, demand for the good at the high price is equal to [1 − m(H)]m(H). The expected proﬁt
from the introductory oﬀer strategy is thus given by
πIO(v(L|G),v(H|G),m(H)) = v(L|G)m(H)+ρv(H|G)[1− m(H)]m(H). (13)
This introductory oﬀer strategy dominates any uniform price if13
v(H|G)m(H) >v (L|G) >v (H|G)m(H)ρ,
v(L|B) <v (L|G)m(H)+v(H|G)m(H)(1 − m(H))ρ, and
v(H|B) <v (L|G)+v(H|G)(1 − m(H))ρ,
Clearly, there exist parameter constellations such that these conditions are satisﬁed simultaneously.
Final sales versus uniform pricing. We now consider ﬁnal sales strategies, where p1 >p 2. Clearly,
the monopolist has no incentive to ration demand at the high price. She will therefore set ﬁrst-period
capacity k1 = k.A ﬁnal sales strategy can therefore be summarized by the triplet (p1,p 2,k),w h e r e
we suppress ﬁrst-period capacity k1 for notational simplicity. For consumers to be willing to purchase
t h eg o o di nt h eﬁrst period, there must exist a positive probability that consumers are rationed in the
second period.
Consider the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H) − ε). Facing these prices and capacity
commitment, all high type consumer will, in the good demand state, purchase the good in the ﬁrst
13The ﬁrst inequality ensures that the introductory oﬀer strategy dominates the uniform price p = v(L|G); the second
that it dominates p = v(H|G); the third that it performs better than p = v(L|B);a n dt h el a s tt h a ti ti sm o r ep r o ﬁtable
than p = v(H|B).
20period at price v(H|G). Given that all of the high types demand the good in the ﬁrst period, consumers
are rationed with probability 1 in the second period, and so no high type consumer can proﬁtably
deviate by delaying the purchase. In the bad state, however, all high types demand the good in the
second period. Expected proﬁts are then given by
πFS(v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H) − ε)
=[ ( 1 − ρ)v(H|B)+ρv(H|G)][m(H) − ε],
which is decreasing in ε. Taking the limit as ε → 0,p r o ﬁts become
πFS(v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H)) = [(1 − ρ)v(H|B)+ρv(H|G)]m(H). (14)
Note that this strategy implements quantity setting by a monopolist with output q = m(H),w h e r e
prices are determined by a Walrasian auctioneer.14 It is immediate to see that this ﬁnal sales strategy
dominates uniform prices p = v(H|B) and p = v(H|G).T h eﬁnal sales strategy performs better than
p = v(H|B) as the monopolist sells the same quan t i t yi ne a c hd e m a n ds t a t e( n a m e l y ,m(H)), but
charges a higher price in the good demand state. It performs better than p = v(H|G) as the monopolist
makes the same proﬁt in the good demand state, but a strictly higher proﬁt in the bad state (where the
monopolist does not sell anything if she charges the uniform price v(H|G)).
Consider now the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(L|G),v(L|B),1−ε). In the good demand state, this strategy
induces both high and low type consumers to demand the good in the ﬁrst period at price v(L|G) (as
the probability of rationing in the second period is 1). In the bad demand state, all consumers demand
t h eg o o di nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d .E x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are thus [(1 − ρ)v(L|B)+ρv(L|G)](1−ε). In the limit
as ε → 0,p r o ﬁts converge to
πFS(v(L|G),v(L|B),1) = (1 − ρ)v(L|B)+ρv(L|G)
Note that this strategy implements quantity setting by a monopolist with output q =1 , where prices are
determined by a Walrasian auctioneer. Clearly this strategy dominates the uniform pricing strategies
p = v(L|B) and p = v(L|G).
Since uniform prices p = v(H|B) and p = v(H|G) are dominated by ﬁnal sales strategy (v(H|G),
v(H|B),m(H)), and uniform prices p = v(L|B) and p = v(L|G) by (v(L|G),v(L|B),1), uniform pricing
cannot be optimal.
Lemma 15 Under weak vertical demand shifts, uniform pricing strategies are less proﬁtable than ﬁnal
sales strategies.
It is possible to show that the two ﬁnal sales strategies described above, (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H))
and (v(L|G),v(L|B),1), are the only optimal ones. To see this, note that if consumers are rationed in
the second period, there exists a marginal consumer with willingness to pay b v who is indiﬀerent between
purchasing the good in the ﬁrst period and delaying the purchase. Suppose that, in some demand state,
consumer beliefs are such that all high types purchase the good at price p1 in the ﬁrst period, and all
remaining capacity is sold in the second period at price p1. Then, the marginal consumer b v satisﬁes





= b v − p1 for k ∈ [m(H),1].
14Let us make two remarks. (i) Due to the discontinuity in demand (at m(H)), there is a continuum of prices which
clear the market for a ﬁxed quantity (in a given demand state). Our assertion holds true if one selects the highest price
which clears the market. (ii) While it is not the aim of our analysis to compare price and quantity setting strategies, some
of our comparisons can be interpreted in this way. An early contribution on price versus quantity setting in a central
planner’s problem is Weitzman (1974). Klemperer and Meyer (1986) compare price and quantity setting in an oligopoly
model.












which is linear in capacity k. Assuming the high types demand the good at the high price only in the
good demand state, but at the low price in the bad demand state, the monopolist’s expected proﬁt
can be written as ρ[p1(b v,p2;k)m(H)+p2(k − m(H))] + (1 − ρ)p2.S i n c et h ep r o ﬁt is linear in k,t h e r e
can only be two potentially optimal capacity levels: k = m(H) and k =1 . Clearly, for k = m(H),
the monopolist does best with strategy (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H)), where in each demand state, the
monopolist extracts all of the rents from the high type consumers. For capacity k =1 ,n o t et h a t
p1(b v,p2;1) = p2. Hence, with capacity k =1 , the monopolist cannot discriminate between diﬀerent
types. If the monopolist wishes to serve low types in some demand state, she does therefore best by
using the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(L|G),v(L|B),1), where in each demand state, she extracts all of the
rents from the low type consumers.
Lemma 16 Under weak vertical demand shifts, the only potentially optimal ﬁnal strategies are (v(H|G),
v(H|B),m(H)) and (v(L|G),v(L|B),1).
Final sales versus introductory oﬀers. Since uniform pricing strategies are never optimal if one
allows for ﬁnal sales strategies, the monopolist uses either ﬁnal sales or introductory oﬀer strategies.
Comparing equations (13) and (14), we ﬁnd that the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H)) gives
higher expected proﬁts than the introductory oﬀer strategy (v(L|G), v(H|G), m(H)) if and only if
(1 − ρ)v(H|B)+ρm(H)v(H|G) >v (L|G).
Since v(H|B) >v (L|G), this inequality is implied by m(H)v(H|G) >v (L|G), which is a necessary
condition for the introductory oﬀer strategy to dominate uniform pricing. Since uniform pricing is
always dominated by one ﬁnal sales strategy, introductory oﬀers cannot be an optimal strategy in our
setting. Hence, any optimal pricing strategy involves ﬁnal sales.
Lemma 17 Under weak vertical demand shifts, any optimal pricing strategy is a ﬁnal sales strategy,
and so p1 >p 2.
Strong vertical demand shifts. Suppose now that demand shocks are suﬃciently strong so that
v(H|B) ≤ v(L|G).
Uniform pricing versus introductory oﬀers. First, we consider uniform pricing, where the monopolist
sets the same price p in both periods. The monopolist optimally sets capacities k1 = k =1so as to






ρm(H)v(H|G) if p = v(H|G),
ρv(L|G) if p = v(L|G),
[(1 − ρ)m(H)+ρ]v(H|B) if p = v(H|B),
v(L|B) if p = v(L|B).
Second, we consider introductory oﬀers, where p1 <p 2. Since the monopolist optimally sets total
capacity k =1so as to always meet demand in the second period, an introductory oﬀer strategy can
be summarized by the triplet (p1,p 2,k 1),w h e r ek1 ∈ (0,1). Exploiting the (piecewise) linearity of
πIO(p1,p 2,k 1) in k1, we can reduce the number of potentially optimal introductory oﬀer strategies.
Lemma 18 Suppose vertical demand shifts are strong.
221. Assume m(H)v(H|G) <v (L|G). Among the set of pricing strategies with a nondecreasing price
path, the only potentially optimal introductory oﬀer strategy is (v(H|B),v(L|G),m(H)).
2. Assume m(H)v(H|G) >v (L|G). Among the set of pricing strategies with a nondecreasing price
path, the only potentially optimal introductory oﬀer strategy is (v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)).
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma implies that either a uniform price or the introductory oﬀer strategies (v(H|B),v(L|G),
m(H)) or (v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)) are optimal among the set of strategies with p1 ≤ p2. The expected
proﬁtf r o m(v(H|B),v(L|G),m(H)) is
πIO(v(H|B),v(L|G),m(H)) = m(H)v(H|B)+ρ[1 − m(H)]v(L|G), (15)
and the proﬁtf r o m(v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)) is
πIO(v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)) = m(H)v(H|B)+ρm(H)[1− m(H)]v(H|G). (16)
Comparing the proﬁts with those under uniform pricing, we ﬁnd that introductory oﬀer strategy
(v(H|B),v(L|G),m(H)) is optimal if
v(L|G) >m (H)v(H|G) >v (H|B) > max{ρv(L|G),
v(L|B) − ρ[1 − m(H)]v(L|G)
m(H)
¾
Introductory oﬀer strategy (v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)) is optimal if
m(H)v(H|G) >v (L|G) ≥ v(H|B) > max{ρm(H)v(H|G),
v(L|B)
m(H)
− ρ[1 − m(H)]v(H|G)
¾
.
Final sales versus uniform pricing. We now turn to ﬁnal sales strategies, where p1 >p 2.S i n c et h e
monopolist optimally sets the ﬁrst-period capacity k1 = k,aﬁnal sales strategy can be summarized by
the triplet (p1,p 2,k).
Let us ﬁrst consider those ﬁnal sales strategies, which are potentially optimal when demand shocks
are weak (see our analysis above), namely (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H)) and (v(L|G),v(L|B),1).E x p e c t e d
proﬁts from the former strategy are
πFS(v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H)) = [ρv(H|G)+( 1− ρ)v(H|B)]m(H). (17)
Note that this ﬁnal sales strategy dominates the uniform price p = v(H|G), but (in contrast to the case
of weak demand shifts) not necessarily the uniform price p = v(H|B).E x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts from ﬁnal sales
strategy (v(L|G),v(L|B),1) are
πFS(v(L|G),v(L|B),1) = ρv(L|G)+( 1− ρ)v(L|B).
As in the case of weak demand shifts, this strategy dominates the uniform prices p = v(L|G) and
p = v(L|B). In contrast to the case of weak demand shifts, there is a third ﬁnal sales strategy which
can be optimal, namely (v(L|G),v(H|B),1).N o t et h a tt h i sﬁnal sales strategy does not correspond to
any quantity setting strategy (since the monopolist sells a mass 1 in the good state but only a mass
m(H) in the bad demand state). This strategy yields proﬁts
πFS(v(L|G),v(H|B),1) = ρv(L|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H)v(H|B), (18)
and thus dominates the uniform price p = v(H|B). There are no other proﬁtable ﬁnal sales strategies.
Hence, we have the following result.
23Lemma 19 Under strong vertical demand shifts, uniform pricing strategies are less proﬁtable than ﬁnal
sales strategies.
Final sales versus introductory oﬀers. Since uniform prices are always dominated by ﬁnal sales
strategies (and sometimes by introductory oﬀers), any optimal pricing strategy must either be a ﬁnal
sales or an introductory oﬀer strategy.
If m(H)v(H|G) >v (L|G), the only introductory oﬀer strategy which can be optimal in the space of
strategies with nondecreasing price paths is (v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)). Comparing equations (16) and
(17), we ﬁnd that this strategy is (weakly) dominated by the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H))
if and only if m(H)v(H|G) ≥ v(L|G), which is the necessary condition for the introductory oﬀer strategy
to dominate other nondecreasing pricing strategies.
If m(H)v(H|G) <v (L|G), the only introductory oﬀer strategy which can be optimal in the space
of strategies with nondecreasing price paths is (v(H|B),v(L|G),m(H)). Comparing equations (15) and
(18), we ﬁnd that this strategy is (weakly) dominated by the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(L|G),v(H|B),1) if
and only if m(H)v(H|G) ≤ v(L|G), which is the necessary condition for the introductory oﬀer strategy
to dominate other nondecreasing pricing strategies.
Hence, any introductory oﬀer strategy is dominated by some ﬁnal sales strategy.
Lemma 20 Under strong vertical demand shifts, any optimal pricing strategy is a ﬁnal sales strategy,
and so p1 >p 2.
Vertical demand shifts: Main results. Summarizing our results on optimal pricing under strong
and weak demand shifts (lemmas 17 and 20), we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 21 In the model with vertical demand shifts, the optimal strategy of the monopolist in-
volves ﬁnal sales and hence a strictly decreasing price path, p1 >p 2.
Rationing rule. Using the same arguments as in the previous section (see the discussion of strong
horizontal demand shifts), we can show that our results are robust to introducing any positively selective
rationing rule. We summarize this observation in the following remark.
Remark 4 Proposition 21 holds for any positively selective rationing rule.
Strategy space. As before, we derived our results assuming that the monopolist can set prices and
quantities in only two periods. Our results remain unchanged if we allow for more than two periods.
Remark 5 Consider an extended strategy space in which, for any ﬁnite number of periods T,t h em o -
nopolist sets prices and capacities. Any optimal strategy in the two-period model remains optimal in the
model with T>2 periods.15
Proof. The proof is rather lengthy and is available from the authors upon request.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that introductory oﬀer strategies are never optimal if the monopolist can
use ﬁnal sales strategies. Furthermore, we have shown that, under horizontal demand shifts, the optimal
pricing policy can generate intertemporal price dispersion.
15To write a two-period ﬁnal sales strategy in the T-period extension, we can set p3,...,p T = ∞ and k2 = k3 = ... =
kT = k.
24Below, we discuss our key assumptions. We distinguish between assumptions concerning market
characteristics, demand side characteristics, and supply side characteristics.
Market characteristics: Rationing. In our analysis, we have assumed random or proportional ra-
tioning (where high type consumers are rationed with the same probability as low types). In general,
the optimal strategy of the monopolist depends on the particular rationing rule. Clearly, any change in
the rationing rule toward eﬃcient (or parallel) rationing (so that high type consumers are rationed with
a lower probability than low types) makes it more diﬃcult for the monopolist to use rationing as a tool
of her optimal strategy. This will reduce the proﬁtability of ﬁnal sales and introductory oﬀer strategies.
However, if the optimal strategy involves rationing with probability 1, then the rationing rule becomes
irrelevant. In particular, any ﬁnal sales strategy which is optimal under proportional rationing and
involves price dispersion across demand states, but not within demand states, remains optimal under
any rationing rule where low type consumers are rationed with a higher probability than high types (see
Section 4).
Demand side: Multiplicity of consumer equilibrium. As pointed out before, for any given ﬁnal sales
strategy, there may be a multiplicity of consumer equilibria. In our analysis, we have selected the
consumer equilibrium that is most favorable for the monopolist. We now want to argue that the best
consumer equilibrium (from the monopolist’s point of view) is often the unique consumer equilibrium
if one introduces some heterogeneity amongst consumers of a particular type (in our example below,
amongst high valuation consumers). We illustrate this observation in Appendix 2.
Demand side: Consumer decision making. For ﬁnal sales strategy to work, consumers have to form
beliefs about the likelihood of being rationed in the future. Since the probability of rationing depends
on the behavior of other consumers, high type consumer do not have a dominant strategy. This requires
consumers to be quite sophisticated in their decision-making. In contrast, when facing an introductory
oﬀer strategy (or a uniform price), consumers have a dominant strategy (and can follow a simple decision
rule): “demand the good at the low price; if it is sold out at this price, buy it at the higher price (provided
the price is less than your valuation).” In a world where consumers are not sophisticated decision makers,
this implies that a ﬁrm may favor an introductory oﬀer strategy (or a uniform price) over a ﬁnal sales
strategy.
Supply side: Capacity costs. We have assumed that the monopolist faces zero costs of capacity.
Would introductory oﬀers still be dominated if we allowed for positive capacity costs? In our analysis,
we have shown that whenever an introductory oﬀer strategy performs better than uniform pricing, it
is dominated by some ﬁnal sales strategy. One can show that any such ﬁnal sales strategy can be
implemented with a smaller capacity kthan the dominated introductory oﬀer strategy. Holding the
capacity choices ﬁxed, an increase in the costs of capacity thus makes the introductory oﬀer strategy
even less proﬁt a b l er e l a t i v et ot h eﬁnal sales strategy. This suggests that introductory oﬀer strategies
are still dominated in the presence of positive capacity costs.
Supply side: Fixed capacity. In our analysis, we have assumed that the monopolist chooses total
capacity k. Suppose now instead that the monopolist faces the restriction k ≤ k,w h e r ek is an exogenous
capacity limit. This hypothesis may apply well to the case of ticket sales for concerts and the like,
w h e r et h em a x i m u mn u m b e ro fs e a t si nt h ec o n c e r th a l li sﬁx e d . H o wd o e st h i sa s s u m p t i o na ﬀect
the proﬁtability of the diﬀerent pricing strategies? To address this question, let us consider the case of
horizontal demand shifts when consumers only know their own valuation. In the absence of an exogenous
capacity limit, the (maximum) output sold in the good demand state is lower under the best ﬁnal sales
strategy than under the best introductory oﬀer strategy. We can then easily show that whenever there
exists a ﬁnal sales strategy which dominates introductory oﬀers in the absence of exogenous capacity
limits, there exists some ﬁnal sales strategy which dominates introductory oﬀers in the presence of
exogenous capacity limits.16 Hence, ﬁnal sales strategies perform even better - relative to introductory
16Note that for suﬃciently small exogenous capacities, namely k ≤ m(H|B),o p t i m a lﬁnal sales and introductory oﬀer
25oﬀer strategies - when the monopolist faces an (exogenous) capacity constraint.
However, this does not mean that introductory oﬀer strategies cannot be optimal in this case. To
see this, note that the monopolist may operate in an environment in which introductory oﬀer strategies
dominate ﬁnal sales strategies. In section 3, we have shown that, in this case, introductory oﬀer strategies
are dominated by the uniform price p = v(L). This may no longer hold when the monopolist faces an
exogenous capacity limit. To be precise, without exogenous capacity limits, introductory oﬀers are
dominated by ﬁnal sales strategies if m(H|G) > [m(H|G)+m(L|G)]v(L), and by the uniform price
p = v(L) if the reverse inequality holds. The best introductory oﬀer strategy involves, in the good







m(H|G) ≡ b k,
which is always less than m(H|G)+m(L|G). Hence, for k ∈ [b k,m(H|G)+m(L|G)), the exogenous
capacity limit is not binding when the monopolist uses this strategy. On the other hand, for k<
m(H|G)+m(L|G), the capacity constraint would be binding if the monopolist used the uniform price
p = v(L). Therefore, there exist parameter constellations under which introductory oﬀer strategies are
optimal in the presence of exogenous capacity limits. In particular, at k = b k, the best introductory oﬀer
strategy and the uniform price p = v(L) induce the same quantity sold in both demand states, but in
the high demand state some units are sold at the high price when the monopolist uses the introductory
oﬀer.
To summarize, exogenous capacity limits make ﬁnal sales more attractive relative to introductory
oﬀers. However, there exist parameter constellations under which introductory oﬀer strategies are
optimal since a (low) uniform price becomes less attractive when the monopolist faces an exogenous
capacity constraint.
Supply side: The monopolist’s decision making. In our model, we have assumed that the monopolist
ex ante commits to a price for each period, a ﬁrst-period capacity, and a total capacity. Not all of the
available selling strategies require such commitment, however.
• Price commitment. Introductory oﬀer strategies may require less (intertemporal) commitment
power than ﬁnal sales strategies. When using an introductory oﬀer strategy, the monopolist has
no incentive to change her price (or capacity) ex post in period 2. (In fact, it can be shown that
an introductory oﬀer strategy does not require commitment the second-period price.) In contrast,
when using a ﬁnal sales strategy, the monopolist has ex post an incentive to raise her capacity or
price in period 2.
• Capacity commitment. A ﬁnal sales strategy requires a commitment to total capacity. Such
commitment can be implemented if total production is determined ex ante and if the production
of additional units is suﬃciently costly (high marginal costs or high ﬁx e dc o s t sf o ra na d d i t i o n a l
run). An introductory oﬀer strategy requires a commitment to ﬁrst-period capacity. This can be
implemented if the monopolist produces in each period and has limited production capacity per
period.
Hence, while our (simple) model predicts that we should not observe introductory oﬀers (but rather
ﬁnal sales and uniform prices), the demanding commitment requirements for ﬁnal sales strategies may
give a rationale, within our framework, for the use of introductory oﬀer strategies.17
strategies degenerate to uniform pricing.
17In particular, introductory oﬀer strategies can be used in durable goods monopoly with a Coasian commitment problem
(see Denicolo and Garella, 1999).
26Another reason for the use of introductory oﬀe r ss t r a t e g i e si st h a t ,i nc o n t r a s tt oﬁnal sales, goods
can be oﬀered concurrently at diﬀerent prices, and consumers can freely choose at which price they want
to buy the good. Clearly, consumers will select the cheaper units ﬁrst, and once these items are stocked
out, high valuation consumers purchase the high priced units.
Our paper is also connected to several general themes in the industrial organization and microeco-
nomics literature.
The economics of rationing. In this paper, we provide a justiﬁcation for the use of rationing as part
of the optimal strategy of a monopolist. However, ours is not the ﬁrst paper pointing out that consumer
rationing may be an equilibrium phenomenon. Apart from consumer segmentation, reasons for rationing
include sunk investments by consumers (Gilbert and Klemperer, 2000), buying frenzies (DeGraba, 1995),
bundling (DeGraba and Mohammed, 1999), and direct demand externalities (e.g. Becker, 1991, Karni
and Levin, 1994). In our model, we do not need any of these demand-side considerations to generate
rationing as an equilibrium outcome.
Price dispersion. Our paper contributes to the literature on price dispersion, initiated by Salop
(1977). In our model, we distinguish between price dispersion across states and within states. Price
dispersion across demand states means that the monopolist posts diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent periods
but, in each demand state, trade occurs in only one period. Price dispersion within states means that,
in at least one demand state, actual trade occurs at diﬀerent prices. We have shown that, under vertical
demand shifts, ﬁnal sales induce price dispersion across states but not within states. In contrast, under
horizontal demand shifts, ﬁnal sales can give rise to price dispersion within states. (This holds for some
ﬁnal sales strategies when consumers learn the state of the world before purchasing, and for all optimal
ﬁnal sales strategies when consumers only learn their own type.) The diﬀerence between horizontal and
vertical demand shifts may be explained as follows. Under vertical demand shifts, the number of high
and low type consumers is the same across states. Hence, it is optimal for the monopolist not to separate
between types, but rather between demand states. Consequently, any rationing occurs with probability
1. Under horizontal demand shifts, on the other hand, the number of high and low types depends on
the demand state. The optimal ﬁnal sales strategy may, therefore, be such that all consumers are served
(at the low price) in the bad demand state, whereas rationing occurs with probability less than 1 in
the good demand state. In our model, intertemporal price dispersion (within states) may thus arise
in the absence of discounting (see, for instance, Stokey, 1979, for an analysis of price dispersion with
discounting ). We may interpret the probability of rationing in our model as a “discount rate”, which
is endogenously determined.
Endogenous quality. Our paper is also loosely connected to the literature on product diﬀerentiation.
In the context of ﬁnal sales, we may interpret the probability of obtaining the good as the quality of
the good. If the price of the good is adjusted by this probability, the model corresponds to a model
of quality diﬀerentiation such as Mussa and Rosen (1978). In contrast to Mussa and Rosen (and the
literature on vertical product diﬀerentiation in general), the good’s quality under a priority pricing
scheme is endogenously determined by demand (and thus ultimately by prices and capacity). In the
literature on product diﬀerentiation, on the other hand, the ﬁrm directly controls quality. The use of
diﬀerent qualities or classes of service is common in the pricing of tickets (see Rosen and Rosenﬁeld,
1997, for an economic analysis ).
Final sales as a marketing strategy. More generally, our paper contributes to the literature on
selling strategies of a ﬁrm with market power. We have shown that a ﬁnal sales strategy, which involves
restricting total capacity and thus leads to consumer rationing, may eﬀectively separate between demand
states and consumers types. Sophisticated price-capacity strategies can thus be used by a monopolist to
segment the market for a homogeneous good. Price-capacity strategies may be superior to other non-
price strategies such as product diﬀerentiation, which may be more costly to implement or may reduce
consumers’ reservation values (as in the case of damaged goods). Introductory oﬀer strategies are less
27“sophisticated” than ﬁnal sales strategies in that they do not fully segment the market by consumer
types. In our world with commitment and rationalc o n s u m e r s ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a ti n t r o d u c t o r yo ﬀer
strategies are never the optimal marketing strategy. Nevertheless, as argued above, since they require
less sophisticated consumer behavior (and perhaps less commitment power by the seller), introductory
oﬀers may sometimes be the preferred selling strategy.
28Appendix 1: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
As pointed out in the main text, any optimal ﬁnal sales strategy must be such that all high types
are just willing to demand the good at the high price. Hence, any optimal ﬁnal sales strategy is of the
form (b p1(k),v(L),k),w h e r eb p1(k) is chosen so as to make high type consumers just indiﬀerent between
purchasing at b p1(k) and delaying the purchase.
Step 1. Suppose k ∈ [m(H|B),m(H|G)]. In this case, rationing occurs even at the high ﬁrst-period
price (when demand is in the good state). If k ≤ min{m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)},ah i g ht y p e
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The monopolist’s expected proﬁti st h e n
πFS(b p1(k),v(L),k)
= ρb p1(k)k +( 1− ρ)[b p1(k)m(H|B)+v(L)[k − m(H|B)]],
which is non-linear in k.










and the expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y
πFS(b p1(k),v(L),k)
= ρb p1(k)k +( 1− ρ)[b p1(k)m(H|B)+v(L)m(L|B)],
which again is non-linear in k.
Let







and note that p1(k) > b p1(k) for all k<m (H|G),a n dp1(m(H|G)) = b p1(m(H|G)).N e x t ,l e t
πFS(p1(k),v(L),k) ≡
ρp1(k)m(H|G)+( 1− ρ){p1(k)m(H|B)+v(L)min{k − m(H|B)},m(L|B)},
and note that πFS(p1(k),v(L),k) >π FS(b p1(k),v(L),k) for all k<m (H|G),a n dπFS(p1(m(H|G)),
v(L),m(H|G)) = πFS(b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)). Moreover, observe that πFS(p1(k),v(L),k) is linear
in k for k ≤ min{m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)}, and independent of k on [m(H|B)+m(L|B),m(H|G)].
29We now claim that πFS(p1(m(H|B)),v(L),m(H|B)) is equal to πU(1), the proﬁt from the uniform
price p =1 .T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a tp1(m(H|B)) = 1,a n d
πFS(1,v(L),m(H|B)) = ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)=πU(1).
Since πFS(p1(k),v(L),k) is linear for k ≤ min{m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)}, it follows that an optimal ﬁ-
nal sales strategy must have k ≥ min{m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)}.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eπFS(p1(k),v(L),k)
is constant on [m(H|B)+m(L|B),m(H|G)], strictly larger than πFS(b p1(k),v(L),k) for all k<m (H|G),
and πFS(p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) = πFS(b p1(m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)),a no p t i m a lﬁnal sales strat-
egy must have k ≥ m(H|G). Hence, there cannot be rationing at the high price.
Step 2. Suppose k ∈ [m(H|G),m(H|G)+m(L|G)]. In this case, rationing can only occur at the low
price. The indiﬀerence condition for high type consumers can now be written as














The expected proﬁti st h e n
πFS(b p1(k),v(L),k)
= ρ{b p1(k)m(H|G)+v(L)[k − m(H|G)]}
+(1 − ρ)[{b p1(k)m(H|B)+v(L)min[m(L|B),k− m(H|B)]},
which is linear in k on [m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)], provided this interval is non-empty (i.e., when
horizontal demand shifts are weak), and on [max{m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)},m(H|G)+m(L|G)].
Hence, under strong horizontal demand shifts (where m(H|G) ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B)), the unique
candidate for an interior optimum is at capacity k = m(H|G). Under weak horizontal demand shifts
(where m(H|G) <m (H|B)+m(L|B)), there are two candidates: k = m(H|G) and k = m(H|B)+
m(L|B).
Proof of Lemma 6
Under horizontal demand shifts, m(H|G) ≥ m(H|B) and m(H|G)+m(L|G) ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B)
with at least one strict inequality. We prove the assertion under the assumption that m(H|G) >
m(H|B).( The proof for the case when m(H|G)=m(H|B) and m(H|G)+m(L|G) >m (H|B)+m(L|B)
proceeds analogously.) First, note that if k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|G)],t h e npG
1 (k)=1>p B
1 (k),a n ds o
the assertion holds true. Second, if k ∈ [m(H|B)+m(L|B),m(H|G)+m(L|G)],t h e npB
1 (k)=v(L) <
pG
1 (k) Third, assume that k ∈ (m(H|G),m(H|B)+m(L|B)). It is immediate to see that pG
1 (k) >p B
1 (k)







Since m(H|G) >m (H|B), this inequality is satisﬁed (and hence the claim is shown) if m(L|G) ≥
m(L|B). Suppose now that m(L|G) <m (L|B). Then, pG
1 (k) >p B





The r.h.s. of this inequality is larger than or equal to m(H|G)+m(L|G) if and only if m(H|G)+m(L|G) ≥
m(H|B)+m(L|B), which we assumed. Hence, pG
1 (k) >p B
1 (k) for all k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|G)+m(L|G)).
30Proof of Lemma 7
In the main text, we have shown that the ﬁnal sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)) is the only potentially
optimal one amongst the family of ﬁnal sales strategies (pG
1 (k),v(L),k). We now consider ﬁnal sales
strategies of the family (pB
1 (k),v(L),k), where high types are just induced to buy in the ﬁrst period
when demand is in the bad state. We have to show that these strategies are dominated either by the
ﬁnal sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)) or by a uniform price. First, note that we can exclude capacities
k ≤ m(H|B) as, in this case, pσ
1(k)=1for σ = G,B, and in both demand states all capacities is sold in
the ﬁr s tp e r i o da tap r i c eo f1, and the monopolist earns proﬁt k. (The monopolist would then be strictly
better oﬀ by charging a uniform price of 1 and serving all demand at that price.) Second, note that we
can exclude capacities k ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B) as this would result in uniform pricing: pB
1 (k)=v(L)
for k ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B). It remains to consider capacities k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|B)+m(L|B));t h e




1 (k)+( 1− ρ)
©
m(H|B)pB
1 (k)+[ k − m(H|B)]v(L)
ª
,
which is quadratic in capacity k. We now show that, for k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|B)+m(L|B)),t h i ss t r a t e g y
is dominated by the ﬁnal sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)) or the uniform price p =1 .
For k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|B)+m(L|B)), the proﬁtf r o mﬁnal sales strategy (pB
1 (k),v(L),k) in the
bad state is m(H|B)pB
1 (k)+[k−m(H|B)]v(L). Since this expression is linear in k, it is bounded above
by max{m(H|B),(m(L|B)+m(H|B))v(L)}. The proﬁt in the good state is kpB
1 (k).
Step 1. Suppose that (m(L|B)+m(H|B))v(L) ≥ m(H|B). Then, the strategy (pB
1 (k),v(L),k) is
dominated by the ﬁnal sales strategy (1,v(L),m(H|G)). To see this, note that the latter strategy gives
weakly higher proﬁt in the bad state (namely, (m(L|B)+m(H|B))v(L)). It is therefore suﬃcient to show
that, in the good state, the proﬁtf r o m(1,v(L),m(H|G)),w h i c hi sm(H|G), is greater or equal to the
proﬁtf r o m(pB
1 (k),v(L),k),w h i c hi skpB
1 (k).S i n c epB
1 (k) ≤ 1 and k ≤ m(H|B)+m(L|B) <m (H|G),
this proﬁt ranking holds good.
Step 2. Suppose now that (m(L|B)+m(H|B))v(L) <m (H|B). Then, the strategy (pB
1 (k),v(L),k)
is dominated by the uniform price p =1 . To see this, note that the uniform price gives a weakly
higher proﬁt in the bad state, namely m(H|B). Moreover, uniform pricing gives a proﬁto fm(H|G)
in the good state, which is strictly higher than the corresponding proﬁtf r o m(pB
1 (k),v(L),k),w h i c hi s
kpB
1 (k) ≤ k<m (H|G).
This shows that a ﬁnal sales strategy of the family (pB
1 (k),v(L),k) can never be optimal.
Proof of Lemma 8










. As argued in the proof of lemma 7, we can exclude capacities k ≤ m(H|B) and
k ≥ m(H|σ)+m(L|σ) for strategy (pσ
1(k),v(L),k), σ = G,B, since for these capacities all items would
always be sold at the same price. For capacity k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|G)+m(L|G)), the expected proﬁt













Since the proﬁt function is piecewise linear in k, there are two potentially optimal capacity levels:
k = m(H|G) and k = m(H|B)+m(L|B). For capacity k ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|B)+m(L|B)), the expected
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1 min{m(H|G),k} +m a x{k − m(H|G),0}v(L)
¤
.
Since the proﬁt function is piecewise linear in k, there is only one potentially optimal capacity level:
k = m(H|G).
We thus have three potentially optimal ﬁnal sales strategies.
• FS 1: (1,v(L),m(H|G)) with expected proﬁt
πFS(1,v(L),m(H|G)) = (1 − ρ)m(H|G)v(L)+ρm(H|G).
• FS 2: (pG






1 (m(L|B)+m(H|B)) + [m(L|B)+m(H|B)
−m(H|G)]v(L)] + (1 − ρ)[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]v(L),
where
pG






• FS 3: (pB
1 (m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G)) with expected proﬁt
πFS(pB
1 (m(H|G)),v(L),m(H|G))
=[ ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)]pB
1 (m(H|G))
+(1 − ρ)[m(H|G) − m(H|B)]v(L),
where
pB






Step 2. We now show that FS 3 is dominated by uniform pricing. FS 3 is (weakly) more proﬁtable
than the uniform price p =1if and only if
pB
1 (m(H|G)) ≥ 1 −
(1 − ρ)[m(H|G) − m(H|B)]v(L)
ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)
. (19)
Inserting the expression for pB
1 (m(H|G)), this inequality can be rewritten as
ρ[1 − v(L)]m(H|G)
≤ (1 − ρ){[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]v(L) − m(H|B)} (20)
That is, for FS 3 to (weakly) dominate the uniform price p =1 , equation (20) must hold good.
FS 3 is (weakly) more proﬁtable than the uniform price p = v(L) if and only if
pB
1 (m(H|G)) − v(L) ≥
ρm(L|G)+( 1− ρ)[m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G)]
ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)
v(L).
32Inserting the expression for pB
1 (m(H|G)) and multiplying both sides by m(L|B)×[ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)],
we obtain
[ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)][m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G)][1 − v(L)]
≥ ρm(L|G)m(L|B)+( 1− ρ)m(L|B)[m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G)]v(L).
This inequality can be rewritten as
ρm(L|G)m(L|B)+[ m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G)]
×{(1 − ρ)m(L|B)v(L) − [ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)][1 − v(L)]}
≤ 0.
Hence, for FS 3 to (weakly) dominate the uniform price p = v(L) the second term must be (strictly)
negative, and so
(1 − ρ)m(L|B)v(L) < [ρm(H|G)+( 1− ρ)m(H|B)],
or equivalently
ρ[1 − v(L)]m(H|G)
> (1 − ρ){[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]v(L) − m(H|B)} (21)
Note that condition (21) is identical to (20), except that the inequality is reversed. Hence, FS 3 is
dominated by either the uniform price p =1or the uniform price p = v(L).
Proof of Lemma 11
First note that we can restrict ourselves to 4 periods because of 2 states and 2 types. Furthermore,
p ≥ v(L) in all periods with positive sales. Note that if p>v (L) we are in the case of demand uncertainty
with a single type because low-type consumers never buy. In this case, a one-price or two-price strategy
is optimal (compare example 1). Hence we can restrict attention to strategies with pt = v(L) in at
least one period. Furthermore note that we only need to consider prices v(L), 1, and prices such that
high-type consumers in the good or in the bad state are indiﬀerent between buying in that period or
delaying their purchase.
• Suppose p1 =1 . We now argue that for such a price a more-than-two-price strategy cannot be
optimal. Note that one must have k ≤ m(H|G) to have positive sales in period 1. Hence, the low
type does not buy in the good state. Then the pricing in periods later than period 1 can only
target consumers in the bad demand state. From the remark in Section 3 we know that under
demand certainty a uniform price dominates. Hence, there cannot exist optimal more-than-two-
price strategies with p1 =1 .
• Suppose p1 = pG
1 . This means that the ﬁrst period price is set such that high-type consumers in
the good state are made indiﬀerent between buying in period 1 or in some later period. Clearly,
k>m (H|G) because otherwise p1 =1 .F o r k>m (H|G) and pt = v(L) in some period t all
low-type consumers will buy in period t in the good state. Also all consumers in the bad state
will buy at this price. This is not a more-than-two-price strategy.
• Suppose p1 = pB
1 . This means that the ﬁrst period price is set such that high-type consumers in
the bad state are made indiﬀerent between buying in period 1 or in some later period. Clearly,
k>m (H|B) and pt = v(L) in some period t.
First, suppose that no units are sold between periods 1 and t.T h e nw ec a ns e tt =2 . For certain
quantities k2 the monopolist can sell additional units in the good state at a price p =1 . This then
33constitutes a three-price strategy. For any given k2 ∈ [m(H|B),m(L|B)+m(H|B)] it is optimal
to set k1 = m(H|B).P r o ﬁts then are linear in k2 so that the optimal ﬁrst-period price is either
v(L) or 1. Consequently, a more-than-two-price strategy cannot be optimal.
Second, suppose that some units are sold between periods 1 and t.T h e n w e c a n s e t t =3so
that p3 = v(L).S i n c em(H|G) >k>m (H|B) and k1 = m(H|B) the monopolist can sell up to
k − m(H|B) units in period 2 at p2 =1 . This means that the monopolist sells k1 units at price
pB
1 , k − k1 units at price p2 =1in the good demand state and k − k1 units at price p3 = v(L) in
the bad demand state. Such a strategy cannot be optimal because, considering only the bad state,
we know that under certain demand uniform pricing weakly dominates (see the remark in Section
3) and, considering the good demand state, proﬁts are dominated by p =1and k = m(H|G).
Corresponding proﬁts can be obtained through a uniform price or two-price strategy.
• Suppose p1 = v(L). We distinguish two cases: k1 is less or greater than m(L|B)+m(H|B).
Suppose k1 ∈ [m(L|B)+m(H|B),m(L|G)+m(H|G)). Then all consumers in the bad state obtain
t h eg o o di np e r i o d1a tp1 = v(L). Hence, there is unsatisﬁed demand only in the good state.
For this unsatisﬁed demand we know that the optimal strategy from period 2 onward is uniform
pricing (because uncertainty does not play any role so that the remark in Section 3 applies).
Overall, uniform pricing or a two-price strategy is optimal.
Suppose k1 <m (L|B)+m(H|B). In this case there is unsatisﬁed demand in both states. For
given p1 = v(L) and k1 we can look at the truncated problem from period 2 onward (because all
consumers try to buy in period 1 in any case). We then know that either p2 = v(L) or a two-price
strategy is optimal. Clearly, we only need to consider the latter case. Here we know that either
uniform pricing or ﬁnal sales are optimal in the truncated problem (as characterized in the main
text). Overall we either ﬁnd that a two-price strategy is optimal (in uniform pricing is optimal
in the truncated problem) or that a strategy with p1 = v(L), p2 =1 , p3 = v(L) can be optimal.
Clearly, if some consumers buy in period 3 it can be only consumers in the bad state but then no
consumer in the bad state will buy in period 2. Then proﬁts in the bad state are less or equal
to v(L)[m(L|B)+m(H|B)].P r o ﬁts in the good state are less than proﬁts under uniform pricing.
Consequently, the above three-price strategy is dominated by an uniform price or two-price (ﬁnal
sales) strategy (p = v(L) or p1 =1and p2 = v(L), k = m(H|G)).
Proof of Lemma 12
With the same argument as in Lemma 11 we can restrict ourselves to 4 periods, p ≥ v(L) in all
periods with positive sales, and pt = v(L) in at least one period. Furthermore prices are v(L), 1,o r
such that high-type consumers in the good or in the bad state are indiﬀerent between buying in that
period or delaying their purchase.
• Suppose p1 =1 . If the total capacity for goods subsequently priced at less than 1 does not exceed
m(H|G), all high-type consumers buy in the good state in period 1. Otherwise, no consumer
would buy in period 1. Hence, we only have to consider total capacity k ≤ m(H|G) or the
constellation pn =1and kn−1 ≤ m(H|G). Start with the ﬁrst case. Then no low-type consumer
buys in the good state so that we only have to consider prices p2 and p3 which target consumers
in the bad state. If k ≤ m(H|B) there are only sales in the ﬁrst period so that we can restrict
attention to k with m(H|B) <k≤ m(H|G). If there was rationing in the bad state in period
2 the monopolist would set p3 =1so that we were in the second case. Therefore, suppose that
there is no rationing in the bad state in period 2. This implies p2 ≥ p3. The best two-price
strategy with p2 ≥ p3 and k ≤ m(H|G) then is (p2 = pB
1 (m(H|G)),p 3 = v(L),k = m(H|G)).
Taken together this gives rise to the three-price ﬁnal sales strategy (p1 =1 , p2 = pB
1 (m(H|G)),
34p3 = v(L), k1 = k2 = k = m(H|G)). Consider now the second case. High type consumers who
are rationed until the last period buy the good at pn =1 .S i n c e kn−1 ≤ m(H|G) no low-type
consumer buys in the good state. Hence we can restrict attention to three price strategies with
p1 =1 , p3 =1and k2 ≤ m(H|G). Clearly, p2 = v(L) because otherwise no low-type consumer
would ever buy so that under this restriction a uniform price would be optimal. Then k1 = k2.
We do not need to place any restriction on k except that it is large enough to meet all unsatisﬁed
demand in the last period. If k2 ≤ m(H|B) there are no sales in period 2. Hence the monopolist
has to choose k2 ∈ (m(H|B),m(H|G)].S i n c ep r o ﬁts are linear, we obtain as the only candidate
for an optimal strategy in the second case a strategy with k2 = m(H|G). In this case demand
is rationed in period 2 in the bad state with positive probability (and with probability 1 in the
good state). The number m(H|B)+m(L|B) − m(H|G) of consumer did not obtain the good in
the bad state in period 2. A share m(H|B)/[m(L|B)+m(H|B)] is of the high type. Hence, the
monopolist must oﬀer at least e m extra units in period 3 to meet all unsatisﬁed demand at a price
p3 =1 . Taken together this gives rise to the three price strategy (p1 =1 ,p 2 = pB
1 (m(H|G)),p 3 =
v(L),k 1 = k2 = k = m(H|G)). This strategy dominates the above three-price ﬁnal sales strategy
if and only if [m(H|B)+m(L|B)]v(L) >m (H|B). However, the three-price strategy dominates
uniform pricing with p =1if and only if [m(H|B)+m(L|B)]v(L) >m (H|B). Therefore, the
strategy (p1 =1 , p2 = pB
1 (m(H|G)), p3 = v(L), k1 = k2 = k = m(H|G))c a n n o tb eo p t i m a l .
• Suppose p1 = pG
1 . This means that the ﬁrst period price is set such that high-type consumers in
the good state are made indiﬀerent between buying in period 1 or in some later period. Clearly, the
capacity for goods sold at a price less than 1 e k has to be greater than m(H|G) because otherwise
p1 =1 .F o re k ≥ m(H|B)+m(L|B) and pt = v(L) in some period t all low-type consumers will
buy in period t in the good state. Also all consumers in the bad state will buy at this price. This is
not a more-than-two-price strategy. Consider therefore e k with m(H|G) < e k<m (H|B)+m(L|B).
No consumer will buy in period 1 in the bad state. The monopolist can then choose between
ﬁnal sales and introductory oﬀer for consumers in the bad state (a mixture cannot be optimal).
In the ﬁrst case the monopolist sets p1 = pG
1 (e k), p2 = pB
1 (e k), p3 = v(L), k1 = k2 = m(H|G),
k3 = e k. Because proﬁts are linear in e k there does not exist such an optimal three-price strategy.
In the second case the monopolist sets p1 = pG
1 (e k), p2 = v(L), p1 =1 , k1 ∈ [m(H|G),e k], k2 = e k,
k3 ∈ [e k + e m(e k),∞) where






1 (e k)m(H|G)+v(L)[e k − m(H|G)]}
+(1 − ρ)[v(L)e k +1· e m(e k)]
which are linear in e k. Hence such a three-price strategy cannot be optimal.
• Suppose p1 = pB
1 . This means that the ﬁrst period price is set such that high-type consumers in
the bad state are made indiﬀerent between buying in period 1 or in some later period. Clearly,
k>m (H|B) and pt = v(L) in some period t. We do not need to consider ﬁrst-period capacities
k1 <m (H|B) because pB
1 (k1)k1 is convex in k1 on [0,m(H|B)] so that proﬁts are also strictly
convex in k1 on this set.
First, suppose that no units are sold between periods 1 and t.T h e nw ec a ns e tt =2 . For certain
quantities k2 the monopolist can sell additional units in the good state at a price p =1 . This then
35constitutes a three-price strategy. Proﬁts then are linear in k2 on [m(H|B),m(H|G)] so that the
optimal second-period capacity is either m(H|B) or m(H|G). This implies that either there are
no sales in period 2 or that there are no sales in period 3. Consequently, a more-than-two-price
strategy cannot be optimal.
Second, suppose that some units are sold between periods 1 and t.T h e n w e c a n s e t t =3so
that p3 = v(L).I f m(H|G) >k>m (H|B) and k1 = m(H|B) the monopolist can sell up to
k − m(H|B) units in period 2 at p2 =1 . This means that the monopolist sells m(H|B) units at
price pB
1 , k − m(H|B) units at price p2 =1i nt h eg o o dd e m a n ds t a t ea n dk − m(H|B) units at
price p3 = v(L) in the bad demand state. Such a strategy cannot be optimal because, considering
only the bad state, we know that under certain demand uniform pricing weakly dominates (see
t h er e m a r ki nS e c t i o n3 )a n d ,c o n s i d e r i n gt h eg o o dd e m a n ds t a t e ,p r o ﬁts are dominated by p =1
and k = m(H|G). Corresponding proﬁts can be obtained through a uniform price or two-price
strategy. If m(L|B)+m(H|B) >k>m (H|G) and k1 = m(H|B), the monopolist sells m(H|B)
units at price pB
1 , m(H|G) − m(H|B) units at price p2 = pG
1 (k) in the good demand state and
k − m(H|σ) units at price p3 = v(L) in demand state σ.B y s e t t i n g k1 = k2 = m(H|G) the
monopolist can increase proﬁts because it sells m(H|B) units at price pG
1 (k) instead of pB
1 (k).
Hence, this cannot constitute an optimal three-price strategy.
• Suppose p1 = v(L). We distinguish two cases: (i) m(L|B)+m(H|B) <k 1 <m (L|G)+m(H|G),(ii)
k1 ≤ m(L|B)+m(H|B),.
In the ﬁrst case all consumers in the bad state obtain the good in period 1 at p1 = v(L). Hence,
there is unsatisﬁed demand only in the good state. For this unsatisﬁed demand we know that the
optimal strategy from period 2 onward is uniform pricing (because uncertainty does not play any
role so that the remark in Section 3 applies). Overall, uniform pricing or a two-price strategy is
optimal.
In the second case, there is rationing in both demand states. For given p1 = v(L) and k1 we
can look at the truncated problem from period 2 onward (because all consumers try to buy in
period 1 in any case). We then know that either p2 = v(L) or a strategy with p2 >v (L) is
optimal. Clearly, we only need to consider the latter case. In the truncated problem, we have
characterized the optimal strategy (as characterized in the main text and the lemma). Clearly, we
only need to consider possibly optimal strategies in the truncated problem which are not uniform
pricing. First consider the truncated model with three-price strategies of the second type: Setting
k1 > 0 reduces the number of units sold at the high price in the good state while increasing
the total number of units sold. In the bad state no unit will be sold in period 2 in any case
so that a change in k1 is without eﬀect. Hence, writing α = k1/[m(H|G)+m(L|G)] one has
that in the truncated problem the new mass is b m(H|G)=( 1− α)m(H|G). Clearly proﬁts are
linear in α on [0,[m(L|B)+m(H|B)]/[m(L|G)+m(H|G)]]. Hence, such a strategy with α in the
interior cannot be optimal. Second consider the truncated model with three price strategies of
the ﬁrst type. A change in k1 changes the composition of demand in each state: we can write
k1 = α[m(H|G)+m(L|G)] = β[m(H|B)+m(L|B)] which implicitly deﬁnes β(α), which is linear
in α. It then straightforward to check that proﬁts depending on α and β are linear in these
two variables (for k1 ∈ [0,m(L|B)+m(H|B)])s ot h a tas t r a t e g yw i t hk1 in the interior cannot
be optimal. Third consider, the truncated model with ﬁnal sales strategy (starting in period 2)
p2 = pG
1 (b m(H|B)+b m(L|B)), p3 = v(L), k = k1 + b m(H|B)+b m(L|B).P r o ﬁts are linear in α and
β (as deﬁned above) for k1 ∈ [0,m(L|B)+m(H|B)]. Hence, such a three-price strategy cannot
be optimal. We do not consider the truncated model with ﬁnal sales strategy p2 =1 , p3 = v(L),
k = k1 + b m(H|G) because this ﬁnal sales strategy is dominated in the n-period extension of the
model, as argued in the main text below the lemma.
36Proof of Lemma 14. We have to consider the following price pairs (p1,p 2): (v(L|B),(L|G)),
(v(L|B),v(H|B)), (v(L|B),v(H|G)), (v(L|G),v(H|B)), (v(L|G),v(H|G)),a n d(v(H|B),v(H|G)).
We ﬁrst consider prices (v(L|B),v(L|G)). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(L|B),v(L|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)[v(L|B)k1 + v(L|G)(1 − k1)m(H)]
+ρ[v(L|B)k1 + v(L|G)(1 − k1)]
= v(L|B)k1 + v(L|G)(1 − k1)((1 − ρ)m(H)+ρ).
The expression on the right-hand side is linear in k1. Hence, any introductory oﬀer strategy with
k1 ∈ (0,1) is dominated by a uniform price.
Next, consider (v(L|B),v(H|B)).E x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are
πIO(v(L|B),v(H|B),k 1)=( 1 − ρ)[v(L|B)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)m(H)]
+ρ[v(L|B)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)m(H)]
= v(L|B)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)m(H).
Again, the expression on the right-hand side is linear in k1. Hence, any introductory oﬀer strategy with
k1 ∈ (0,1) is dominated by a uniform price.
Next, consider (v(L|B),v(H|G)). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(L|B),v(H|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)v(L|B)k1 + ρ[v(L|B)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)m(H)]
= v(L|B)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)ρm(H).
Again, the expression on the right-hand side is linear in k1. Hence, any introductory oﬀer strategy with
k1 ∈ (0,1) is dominated by a uniform price.
Next, consider (v(L|G),v(H|B)). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(L|G),v(H|B),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)[v(L|G)min{k1,m(H)} + v(H|B)max{0,m(H) − k1}]
+ρ[v(L|G)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)m(H)]
Since expected proﬁts are piecewise linear, the only potentially optimal introductory oﬀer strategy with
k1 ∈ (0,1) has ﬁrst-period capacity k1 = m(H). The expected proﬁt from introductory oﬀer strategy
(v(L|G),v(H|B),m(H)) is given by
πIO(v(L|G),v(H|B),m(H)) = v(L|G)m(H)+v(H|B)m(H)(1 − m(H))ρ. (22)
Next, consider (v(L|G),v(H|G)). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(L|G),v(H|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)[v(L|G)min{k1,m(H)}]
+ρ[v(L|G)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)m(H)]
Since expected proﬁts are piecewise linear, the only potentially optimal introductory oﬀer strategy with
k1 ∈ (0,1) has ﬁrst-period capacity k1 = m(H). The expected proﬁts from the introductory oﬀer
strategy (v(L|G),v(H|B),m(H)) is given by (13). Comparing equations (22) and (13), we ﬁnd that
πIO(v(L|G),v(H|G),m(H)) >π IO(v(L|G),v(H|B),m(H)).
37Finally, consider (v(H|B),v(H|G)).E x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are
πIO(v(H|B),v(H|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)v(H|B)min{k1,m(H)}
+ρ[v(H|B)min{k1,m(H)} + v(H|G)max{0,m(H) − k1}].
Since expected proﬁts are linear in k1 on [0,m(H)] and constant on [m(H),1], any introductory oﬀer
strategy with k1 ∈ (0,1) is weakly dominated by a uniform price.
Proof of Lemma 18. We start with prices p1 = v(L|B),p 2 = v(H|B).E x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are
πIO(v(L|B),v(H|B),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)[v(L|B)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)m(H)]
+ρ[v(L|B)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)]
= v(L|B)k1 + v(H|B)(1 − k1)((1 − ρ)m(H)+ρ).
The expression on the right-hand side is linear in k1. Therefore, the introductory oﬀer strategy is
dominated by a uniform price.
Next take p1 = v(L|B),p 2 = v(L|G). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(L|B),v(L|G),k 1)=( 1 − ρ)v(L|B)k1 + ρ[v(L|B)k1 + v(L|G)(1 − k1)]
= v(L|B)k1 + v(L|G)ρ(1 − k1).
Again, the expression on the right-hand side is linear in k1. Therefore this introductory oﬀer strategy
is dominated by a uniform price.
Next take p1 = v(L|B),p 2 = v(H|G). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(L|B),v(H|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)v(L|B)k1 + ρ[v(L|B)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)m(H)]
= v(L|B)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)ρm(H).
Again, the expression on the right-hand side is linear in k1. Therefore this introductory oﬀer strategy
is dominated by a uniform price.
Next take p1 = v(H|B),p 2 = v(L|G). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(H|B),v(L|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)v(H|B)min{k1,m(H)} + ρ[v(H|B)k1 + v(L|G)(1 − k1)]
=
½
v(H|B)k1 + v(L|G)ρ(1 − k1) if k1 <m (H)
v(H|B)[ρk1 +( 1− ρ)m(H)] + v(L|G)ρ(1 − k1) if k1 ≥ m(H).
Because expected proﬁts are piecewise linear, the ﬁrst-period quantity k1 = m(H) can be the only
interior solution to proﬁt maximization. Hence, with above prices and ﬁrst-period quantity k1 = m(H)
expected proﬁts are given by (15).
Next take p1 = v(H|B),p 2 = v(H|G). Expected proﬁts are
πIO(v(H|B),v(H|G),k 1)
=( 1 − ρ)[v(H|B)min{k1,m(H)}]
+ρ[v(H|B)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)m(H)]
=
½
v(H|B)k1 + v(H|G)ρ(1 − k1)m(H) if k1 <m (H)
v(H|B)[ρk1 +( 1− ρ)m(H)] + v(H|G)ρ(1 − k1)m(H) if k1 ≥ m(H).
38Expected proﬁts with the introductory oﬀer strategy (k1 = m(H)) are given by (16). Note that
πIO(v(H|B),v(H|G),m(H)) >π IO(v(H|B),v(L|G),m(H)) if and only if m(H)v(H|G) >v (L|G) (com-
pare equations (15) and (16)).
Finally take p1 = v(L|G),p 2 = v(H|G).E x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are
πIO(v(L|G),v(H|G),k 1)
= ρ[v(L|G)k1 + v(H|G)(1 − k1)m(H)]
which are linear in k1. Hence, any k1 ∈ (0,1) is weakly dominated by a uniform price.
Appendix 2
Consider the ﬁnal sales strategy (v(H|G),v(H|B),m(H)) under strong vertical demand shifts (where
v(H|B) ≤ v(L|G)). Suppose now there is a continuous distribution of high valuation consumers (in the
good demand state). Speciﬁcally, assume that there are m(H)consumers whose valuations in the good
demand state are uniformly distributed on [v(H|G),v(H|G)+γ],w h e r eγ>0.
Since consumers are atomistic, in any consumer equilibrium there must exist a threshold λ
∗ ∈ [0,1]
such that, in the good demand state, all consumers with valuation above v(H|G)+λ
∗γ buy the good
in the ﬁrst period, while all consumers with valuations less than v(H|G)+λ
∗γ demand the good in the
second period. The monopolist’s capacity is k = m(H), and so the probability of not being rationed
in the second period is λ
∗m(H)/[1 − (1 − λ
∗)m(H)]. In the good demand state, a consumers with
valuation v(H|G)+λγ weakly prefers to demand the good in the second period rather than to purchase




1 − (1 − λ
∗)m(H)
[v(H|G) − v(H|B)+λγ]








In consumer equilibrium, this inequality must hold for all λ ≤ λ
∗. Hence, if γ>γ ∗, the unique
consumer equilibrium is such that λ
∗ =0 : in the good demand state, all consumers with valuations in
[v(H|G),v(H|G)+γ] purchase the good in the ﬁrst period (while all low types demand the good in the
second period and are rationed with probability 1).
Finally, we have to show that there exists a γ>γ ∗ such that the monopolist has no incentive to
charge a price p1 >v (H|G). For this, a consumer with valuation v(H|G)+λ
∗γ is indiﬀerent (in the
good demand state) between purchasing the good at price p1 in the ﬁrst period and demanding the
good at price v(H|B) in the second period if
v(H|G)+λ
∗γ − p1 =
µ
k − (1 − λ
∗)m(H)











k − (1 − λ
∗)m(H)





Instead of choosing k and p1, the monopolist can be thought of as selecting k and λ
∗.F o r a g i v e n
capacity k, the monopolist chooses the marginal consumer λ
∗ so as to maximize her proﬁt in the good






∗,k)+[ k − (1 − λ
∗)m(H)]v(H|B).
39Taking the partial derivative with respect to λ






∗) ≡ γ {(1 − λ
∗)[1− (1 − λ
∗)m(H)] − λ
∗} ≤ v(H|G) − v(H|B).
Since ψ(0) = γ and ψ
0(λ
∗) < 0 for all λ
∗ ∈ [0,1],w eh a v eψ(λ
∗) < 0 for all λ
∗ ∈ [0,1] if γ<
v(H|G) − v(H|B).N o t et h a tv(H|G) − v(H|B) >γ ∗ if and only if m(H)/[1 − m(H)] < 1, i.e., if and
only if m(H) < 1/2.T h a ti s ,i fm(H) < 1/2, there exists a nonempty interval [γ∗,v(H|G) − v(H|B)]
such that if γ falls into this interval, the monopolist has no incentive to charge a ﬁrst-period price
diﬀerent from v(H|G), and all high valuation consumers will buy the good at this price when demand
is in the good state.
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